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The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement
Kathleen S. Morris*
ABSTRACT
This Article calls for the overruling of the central rule in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh (1907) on Erie grounds. Hunter announced as a matter offederal law
that local governments are powerless instrumentalities of state governments.
Legal scholars have criticized Hunterfor exacerbating the doctrinal and practi-
cal problems that plague local government law. This Article goes further by
challenging Hunter directly. It argues first that Erie v. Tompkins (1938), prop-
erly read, effectively overruled the central rule in Hunter. Second, it argues that
we should not mourn the loss of that rule because its analytic support structures
are historically, doctrinally, and logically defective. The Article then narrows
its focus to a doctrine derived from Hunter, the federal rule barring localities
from invoking the Constitution against their own states (the "Hunter doctrine").
It argues that after Erie, the Hunter doctrine is best understood as a doctrine
addressing capacity to sue; that federal courts should defer to state law in decid-
ing whether a particular locality has the capacity to bring a constitutional chal-
lenge against its own state rather than superimposing a national rule; and that
courts and scholars should welcome localities into constitutional debates be-
cause their full participation is pro-local and pro-democratic, and would raise
the overall competence of constitutional debate and local public advocacy. Fi-
nally, looking to the future, the Article calls for scholars to address which of the
Constitution's provisions should apply to localities qua localities; to consider
the circumstances under which the Court should permit localities to pursue rep-
resentative constitutional claims on behalf of their constituents; and to develop
an alternative, post-Hunter theoretical framework for local government law.
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INTRODUCTION
Common legal wisdom has it that the Constitution does not "see" local
public entities, that they are constitutionally invisible. Or, to the extent the
Constitution "sees" localities,' it views them as mere instrumentalities of
' I use the terms "local public entities" and "localities" to include public entities whose
leadership is elected or appointed by locally elected officials, as distinct from entities whose
leadership is appointed by state officials. My working definition includes cities, counties,
towns, and special districts such as school districts, transit districts, water districts, and the
like. If not categorically prohibited from doing so, every type of local government could in
theory state the essential elements of any number of constitutional claims on its own behalf or
on behalf of its constituents.
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their state governments rather than legally separate entities. 2 As the United
States Supreme Court put it in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, in 1907: "Mu-
nicipal Corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as conve-
nient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as
may be intrusted [sic] to them."'
Hunter's general rule that localities are powerless instrumentalities of
state governments quickly gave rise to a subsidiary rule referred to in this
Article as the "Hunter doctrine": Because localities are mere instrumentali-
ties of state governments, the argument goes, they cannot invoke the Consti-
tution against their own states.4
Over the decades since Hunter was decided, the Court has seemed
deeply ambivalent about that case and the Hunter doctrine. The Court has
repeatedly departed sub silentio from Hunter's rule of local powerlessness by
recognizing and treating localities as legally-and sometimes even constitu-
tionally-independent of their states.' Even more astonishingly, the Court
2 See David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution,
115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2232 (2006); see also Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One
Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 347-48 (1993). This is the
dominant federal doctrine. There also exists a so-called "shadow doctrine" in which, without
explanation or mention of Hunter, the Court treats localities as constitutionally-cognizable
entities. See infra note 5.
3 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
4 See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). I say "invoke the Consti-
tution" rather than "pursue constitutional claims" because cases in the Hunter line also bar
localities from invoking the Constitution defensively. See Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey,
199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (a precursor to Hunter). Note that some jurisdictions read Hunter to
bar localities from invoking the Constitution not only against their states but against any public
defendant. See, e.g., Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d
1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1998); Hous. Auth. of the Kaw Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. City of Ponca
City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 1991). Others, however, appear to read Hunter as al-
lowing localities to bring constitutional claims against public entities other than their own
states. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978) (permitting the
City of Philadelphia to sue the State of New Jersey). One U.S. Court of Appeals has suggested
that Hunter bars localities from pursuing not only federal constitutional claims but also federal
statutory claims against their states. See Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kirk,
91 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1996).
5 Scholars refer to these cases as the "shadow doctrine" of local government law. See,
e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political
Currency of Local Government, 50 Bua'. L. REv. 393, 395-96, 407-09 (2002) (explaining
that under the shadow doctrine, local entities "are more than convenient jurisdictional units,
but actually represent independent and robust political communities, worthy of constitutional
recognition. Local political units are not mere instrumentalities of the state, they are autono-
mous actors with broad powers to set local policy"). The Court has treated localities as inde-
pendent from their states for purposes of liability for judgments, the ability to collect on
federal grant obligations, Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Sherman Act, school desegrega-
tion, and voting rights. See Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S.
256, 258 (1985) (holding that states cannot commandeer federal funds granted to localities);
Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,53 (1982) (holding that local ordinances
are not "state action" for purposes of the Sherman Act); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 n.54 (1978) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar municipal
liability in Eleventh Amendment cases as "to local government units which are not considered
part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes"); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
744-45 (1974) (holding that for federal constitutional purposes the relevant boundary lines for
2012] 3
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has not applied the Hunter doctrine to bar a local constitutional challenge
since 1933. Instead, the Court has reached the merits of several such cases
with barely a mention of the Hunter doctrine.6
Notwithstanding the Court's apparently waning interest in both Hunter
and the Hunter doctrine, both are worth examining for two reasons. First,
the Court continues to invoke Hunter's general rule of local powerlessness
when it comes in handy, often in cases of great consequence.' Second, the
Hunter doctrine is alive and well in the lower federal and state courts, where
it continues to bar and chill local constitutional enforcement.8
desegregation are local school districts and not states as a whole); Avery v. Midland Cnty.,
Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968) (holding that local governments must adhere to the "one per-
son, one vote" principle); Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285,
288 (1883) (ruling that a judgment against a locality cannot be collected from the state).
6 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 131 (2004) (considering on the merits
various municipalities' Supremacy Clause challenges to a state statute); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (considering on the merits various municipalities' federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause challenges to state constitutional provision); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 275
(1986) (remanding school officials' Equal Protection Clause challenges to state for considera-
tion on the merits); Lawrence Cnty., 469 U.S. at 258 (considering on the merits a Supremacy
Clause challenge to state action, with Hunter cited in dissent); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (considering on the merits a school district's federal Equal
Protection Clause challenge to a state statute); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1973) (accepting school district's intervention in plaintiffs Equal Protection
Clause challenge to state's school finance scheme); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 240
(1968) (considering a school board's challenge to state mandates on expenditures under the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause).
See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2009) (applying Wil-
liams, a case in the Hunter line, to dispose of First Amendment challenge to "right to work"
law as applied to localities); see infra text accompanying note 86. Although the Court regu-
larly invokes Hunter's general rule of local powerlessness, it is not consistent in how it inter-
prets that rule. Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343 (1960) (interpreting the
Hunter doctrine narrowly as only barring political boundary disputes brought pursuant to the
constitutional provisions at issue in that case), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 299 (1962)
(taking the same view as the Gomillion Court), with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575
(1964) (returning to a broader articulation and application of the Hunter doctrine), Sailors v.
Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1967) (picking up on Reynolds' broad articulation of the
Hunter doctrine and applying it to a non-boundary election dispute), and Holt Civic Club v.
City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (reading Hunter as a broad grant of authority to
states vis-A-vis localities). In recent decades, the Court articulated a broad interpretation of
Hunter. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991) (interpreting
Hunter as a broadly applicable federal doctrine of local powerlessness). Yet the Court has also
entirely ignored Hunter and looked to state law in order to determine the nature of localities
and their relationships to the States. See McMillan v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 795
(1997) (looking to state law to determine the nature and powers of a county sheriff); Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-81 (1977) (looking to state
law to determine the nature and powers of a local board of education). I plan to explore the
Court's confusion over the natures and roles of localities in a future article entitled The Su-
preme Court and Local Governments: A Legal Ontology.
' As I explain in Part III(A) infra, lower federal and state courts have trouble fitting the
Hunter doctrine into a modem legal category. This is unsurprising, since the Hunter doctrine
was founded on Hunter's general federal common law rule of local powerlessness. That doc-
trine simply was not designed to fit into other doctrines of federal constitutional law. Courts
most often categorize the Hunter doctrine as a doctrine addressing substantive constitutional
law or standing to sue. However, since the Hunter doctrine's primary analytical focus is on
4
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As legal scholars have long noted, Hunter dominates the intersection of
constitutional theory and local government law.9 Hunter is unpopular with
scholars, who have consistently described the doctrine of local governmental
powerlessness as analytically muddled,'0 inconsistently applied, and guilty
of posing an unwelcome barrier to efforts at increasing local governmental
power and efficacy." But rather than calling for Hunter to be overruled,
scholars have endeavored to make sense of the case in the larger scheme of
constitutional and local government law.' 2 They have bemoaned Hunter's
doctrinal reach and ill effects, but grudgingly have accepted its theoretical
dominance.
This Article attempts to add to the scholarly debate over Hunter and the
Hunter doctrine on both doctrinal and policy fronts. On the doctrinal front,
the Article offers two arguments. First, it argues that Hunter's federal rule of
local governmental powerlessness vis-A-vis the states was effectively over-
ruled in 1938 by Erie v. Tomkins.13 Second, it argues that we should not
mourn the loss of Hunter because the rule of local powerlessness has always
stood on shaky analytical ground. On the policy front, the Article argues
that there are good reasons to support local constitutional enforcement; such
enforcement has the potential to promote local power, enhance the demo-
cratic legitimacy of constitutional litigation, and shore up local constitutional
competency. This Article also argues that abandoning both Hunter and the
Hunter doctrine may help scholars begin to develop a theory of federalism
that incorporates local public entities.
The Court decided Hunter in 1907. In that case, citizens of Allegheny,
Pennsylvania, brought impairment of contracts and due process challenges
to the state's plan to merge their city with Pittsburgh. 14 The Court could have
what localities "are" and can therefore "do," it is more accurately categorized under the rubric
of capacity to sue.
9 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062 n.9
(1980); see also Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judi-
cial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1337-38 (2009).
"o See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government:
The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83, 84 (1986); see also
Schragger, supra note 5, at 395-96, 407-09.
" See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 562-78 (1999); Frug, supra note 9, at 1121; Schragger, supra note 5,
at 395-96.
12 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 11, at 562-68 (arguing that Hunter's vision of localities is
incomplete because it ignores the social conception of local governments); Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Lw, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85
(1990) (contending that Hunter's top-down view of localities is only the partial story); Michael
A. Lawrence, Do "Creatures of the State" Have Constitutional Rights?: Standing for Munici-
palities to Assert Procedural Due Process Claims Against the State, 47 VILL. L. REv. 93, 102
(2002) (arguing that the principles in Hunter should be applied to some but not all constitu-
tional provisions); Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local Gov-
ernment Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257, 266 (1999) (arguing that Romer established an exception to
Hunter).
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174, 176-78 (1907).
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dispatched plaintiffs' claims on the merits; instead, it used the occasion to
announce a rule that local governments are mere instrumentalities of state
governments, and that a state's decision to adjust local political boundaries
did not raise constitutional concerns." Critically, the Court went on to issue
an open invitation to all federal courts to invoke the federal rule of local
powerlessness "wherever applicable."' 6 Hunter was soon followed by the
Hunter doctrine, which bars localities from invoking the Constitution against
their own states.
In 1938, the Court handed down Erie v. Tompkins, putting an end to
"federal general common law," that is, federal common law rules that are
not tethered to some provision of the Constitution or other body of positive
federal law." The Court has never revisited the central rule of Hunter in
light of Erie. However, Hunter's freestanding rule that local public entities
are powerless vis-A-vis their state governments is not anchored by any con-
stitutional provision or federal statute. That rule therefore appears to be pre-
cisely the sort of "federal general common law" rule that Erie abolished.
Assuming that Erie did overrule Hunter, courts and scholars should not
mourn Hunter's loss, because that case is laden with doctrinal and policy
problems. The logic of Hunter is built on three broad assumptions that upon
close examination are largely incorrect. Hunter's first faulty assumption is
that, for purposes of the legal relationship between localities and their states,
"state government" and the "sovereign state" are conceptually interchange-
able." This is incorrect as a matter of state constitutional law. Thirty-eight
out of fifty state constitutions explicitly state that the People-not the state
government-are the designated "sovereign." 9 Accordingly, local constitu-
tional enforcement is accurately viewed not as an attack on the sovereign
state, but as an act in defense of the sovereign state.2 0
Hunter's second faulty assumption is that, as a categorical matter, state
governments originally created and are free to abolish local governments,
even over the objection of the People. This sweeping presumption is incor-
rect as a matter of state history and state constitutional law. Localities pre-
dated states, and the original state constitutions presupposed their existence
just as the U.S. Constitution presupposes the existence of states.2' State gov-
ernments are not free to abolish all local governments at will.
' Id. at 177-78.16 Id. at 178.
'" Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
18 This Article's claims about sovereignty are grounded entirely in state constitutional law
and limited to the context of local government law. The Article does not address whether state
governments are or should be treated as sovereign for purposes of federal law.
'9 See Kathleen S. Morris, Table of State Constitutions, http://www.harvardcrcl.org/mor-
ris-table-of-state-constitutions/.
20 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435-38
(1987).
21 See James E. Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Divergence Between
Text and Practice in Our Early State Constitutions, 62 VA. L. REv. 999, 1005 (1976) ("The
implication that local entities derive their powers from the legislature did not square well with
6 [Vol. 47
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Hunter's third faulty assumption, which overlaps with the second, is
that localities operate solely as instrumentalities of state governments. By
that logic, a local constitutional challenge to state governmental action is an
absurdity, akin to a creature attacking itself. However, as scholars have long
pointed out, localities serve more than one master. While they act at times
as agents of state governments, at other times they act as agents of their
constituents.2 2 They are necessarily acting in the latter capacity when they
challenge state governmental acts. 23
Assuming that the Court overruled the central rule in Hunter, we would
still be left with the policy question of whether, when, and why courts and
scholars should favor or oppose a partial or total ban on local constitutional
enforcement. For purposes of this policy discussion, it is useful to think of
local constitutional challenges as falling into one of two categories: Claims
brought to remedy harms sustained by the locality itself (termed City
Cases);24 and claims brought to remedy harms sustained by local constituents
(termed Constituent Cases).25 Absent the Hunter doctrine, one could in the-
ory imagine a locality invoking any number of constitutional provisions to
protect its commercial and governmental interests, including the Supremacy
Clause,2 6 the Commerce Clause,27 the prohibition of the impairment of con-
tracts, the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, the guarantee of a trial
by jury, and the Establishment Clause.28 Additionally, one might imagine a
locality invoking any number of individual rights provisions (equal protec-
historical facts."); see also Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARV.
L. REv. 441, 448 (1900); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 48 (1999) (arguing that McQuillin's statement that cities were created by
states "ignores well-established, historical facts, easily ascertainable" (citing EUGENE MC-
QUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 679-81 (2d ed. 1928))).
22 See Briffault, supra note 12, at 85 (noting that localities act in a dual agency capacity);
see also Barron, supra note 2, at 2243 (analogizing cities' interest in protecting citizens to
states' roles in parens patriae cases).
23 I plan to explore these themes further in a future article entitled Agency Theory and the
Local Governments' Constitutions.
24 See Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local
Public Law Offices, Why the Local Matters: Federalism, Localism, and Public Interest
Advocacy, 51, 56-57 (2010), http://www.law.yale.edulwhy-thelocalmattersfinal_122109.
pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2011).
25 See id. This distinction echoes the proprietary actor versus governmental actor distinc-
tion that runs through the law. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle,
291 U.S. 619, 629-31 (1934). While one can easily imagine harms to a locality reaching its
constituents, and vice-versa, the distinction between "City Cases" and "Constituent Cases" is
a useful analytical tool because it helps us to grasp quickly the potentially expansive range of
cases a locality might pursue absent the Hunter doctrine.
26 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 131 (2004) (permitting a municipality to
pursue a claim under the Supremacy Clause).
27 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978) (permitting a city to
pursue a constitutional claim against a neighboring state).
28 See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 240 (1968) (considering a school board's
challenge to state mandates on expenditures under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
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tion, due process, and the like) on behalf of its constituents.29 The relevant
policy question is whether the law should permit localities to pursue such
claims.
The weightiest policy argument against local constitutional enforcement
is that such cases undermine local autonomy.3 0 That is an important obser-
vation, and this Article does not dispute it. The Article argues, however, that
the benefits of local constitutional enforcement could potentially outweigh
concerns about autonomy. Such benefits might include increases in local
power,3 ' the democratic legitimacy of constitutional litigation,3 2 and local
constitutional competency.33 Further benefits might include doctrinal and
theoretical clarity regarding the role of localities in our federalist system.'
While overruling precedent is never to be done lightly, there are good
reasons for doing so in the case of Hunter.35 The doctrine of local
powerlessness has little explanatory power yet prevents courts and scholars
from developing a coherent, nuanced, and useful theoretical framework for
local government law.36 Additionally, Hunter's derivative ban on local con-
stitutional challenges has eclipsed two additional areas of potential scholarly
inquiry, namely, which constitutional provisions, if any, should apply to lo-
calities qua localities and when localities should be permitted to pursue con-
stitutional claims on behalf of their constituents. These questions are beyond
the scope of this Article, but point toward promising areas for future
scholarship.
29 I plan to explore this distinction and other standing issues related to local government in
a future article entitled Local Government Standing.
- See Barron, supra note 2, at 2223; Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Ac-
tors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J. L. & POL. 147, 152-53 (2005).
3" Gerald Frug has argued more generally that our nation should increase power to local
governments because doing so would strengthen their functioning as governments and units of
representative democracy. See FRUG, supra note 21, at 60-61.
32 We might, for example, wonder whether the law should allow non-profit organizations
and private corporations, but not public corporations, access to the Constitution. I plan to
explore this question in more depth in a future article entitled Private Corporations, Public
Corporations, and Constitutional Rights.
33 See FRUG, supra note 21, at 6, 19 (referencing the conventional view that local govern-
ments are inherently selfish, short-sighted, parochial, and ineffectual).
I See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV.
4, 13 (2010) (calling for scholars to develop a theory of federalism that fully accounts for local
public entities).
31 In modern times, the Supreme Court has taken to deciding some cases as if Hunter did
not exist. These cases have formed a body of case law that scholars refer to as the "shadow"
doctrine of local government. See Schragger, supra note 5, at 395-96, 407-09; see also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457, 467 (1982).
36 Scholars have long noted the absence of a workable theoretical framework for local
government law. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 11-Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 356 (1990) ("The different kinds of local governments, with
their diverse needs and often conflicting concerns, cast real doubt on the utility of 'local gov-
ernment' as a category for advancing legal analysis."); see also Gerken, supra note 34, at 25
("[W]e lack a set of common terms-let alone a full-blown theory-for the sites that fall just
below states and cities on the governance flow chart."); Schragger, supra note 5, at 398
(describing localities as politically and doctrinally "untethered").
8 [Vol. 47
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This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I reviews the legal scholarship
addressing the Hunter doctrine. Part II provides a comprehensive account of
the Hunter doctrine's rise and fall in the Supreme Court. Part III discusses
Erie's impact on Hunter. Part IV exposes the defects in Hunter's analytic
support structures. Part V joins the normative debate over local constitu-
tional enforcement. Part VI calls for the development of an alternative, post-
Hunter theoretical framework for local government law.
I. THE DEBATE OVER LOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT
A. Scholars on Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh
Legal scholars explain Hunter as the outcome of a pitched philosophi-
cal battle between a handful of nineteenth-century constitutional theorists,
chief among them John Dillon and Thomas Cooley.17 Dillon believed that
the law should treat localities as state governmental subdivisions with no
inherent political or legal authority.38 Cooley believed the law should recog-
nize localities as having retained some measure of inherent authority when
they relinquished their sovereignty to form states.3 9 In the end, Dillon won,
and Hunter and its derivatives reflect his viewpoint.
Hunter's doctrine of local powerlessness is not popular with legal schol-
ars, but none have challenged it directly. Instead, the existing Hunter schol-
arship points out the case's ill effects and argues that the Court should limit
its reach. For example, Gerald Frug and David Barron have argued that
doctrines of local powerlessness present barriers to public freedom.40 Barron
and others, including Richard Briffault, Michael Lawrence, and Lawrence
Rosenthal, have written that Hunter is overreaching and inadequately cap-
tures the real world activities and powers of local governments. 41 Joan Wil-
liams and Richard Schragger have gone further, hinting at the deeper
doctrinal problems this Article addresses. Williams has described the legal
status of cities as "a startlingly pure example of politics as black-letter
n See GERALD E. FRUo & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION 36 (2008); see also HENDRICK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER
2-3 (1983); Barron, supra note I1, at 496-509; Williams, supra note 10, at 88-89.
3 Dillon's analysis relied heavily on the earlier writings of Chief Justice John Marshall.
See Barron, supra note 11, at 495-509.
39 Id. at 509-22.
40 See id. at 497-505; Frug, supra note 9, at 1065. In The City as a Legal Concept, Frug
wrote that judicially-imposed limits on local power had come to seem so "natural and uncon-
troversial" that scholars had ceased "questioning them or trying to think of ways to change
them." Id.
41 See Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism?'" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1336-49 (1994) (comparing the relation-
ship of states to the federal government with that of localities to states); Gerald E. Frug, Em-
powering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553, 554-56 (1987) (discussing federalism
arguments in the context of localities); Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 260-61; Williams, supra
note 10, at 137-38 (arguing that theories of city status and Burger Court jurisprudence acted as
forum-shifting arguments to rein in municipal power).
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law," 42 and Schragger has accused the Court of leaving local government
law not only politically but also doctrinally "untethered." 43
B. Scholars on the Hunter Doctrine
In recent years, local constitutional challenges to state action-in par-
ticular San Francisco's challenge to California's marriage laws44-triggered a
scholarly debate over whether and when courts should hear constitutional
disputes between localities and their states. The three most prominent voices
in that debate have been David Barron, Richard Schragger, and Heather Ger-
ken.45 Generally speaking, Barron and Schragger favor limits on local con-
stitutional enforcement because it undermines local autonomy. By contrast,
Gerken conceives of local constitutional challenges as healthy forms of "de-
cisional dissent" from the state majority's views.46
In Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitution,
Barron argues that the law should only permit localities to pursue constitu-
tional cases aimed at expanding the scope of local policymaking discretion. 47
He does not believe cities should be permitted to bring other types of consti-
tutional claims because in those cases:
[Localities] are attempting to take discretion away from other cit-
ies by replacing the constraints of state statutes with the con-
straints of the state constitution or Federal Constitution. Cities
have no sufficient interest in pressing these constitutional claims-
whether through refusals to enforce state statutes or suits seeking
to invalidate them-and thus generally should be barred from do-
ing SO. 48
For Barron, a locality that prevails on a local constitutional claim-
however legitimate-ends up forcing state and federal constitutional norms
42 Williams, supra note 10, at 86.
43 Schragger, supra note 5, at 396.
4 See, e.g., In re Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Mar-
riage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
45 Barron, supra note 2, at 2220; Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1745 (2005); Schragger, supra note 5.
' Barron, supra note 2, at 2222; Gerken, supra note 45, at 1749; Schragger, supra note 5,
at 396.
47 Barron, supra note 2, at 2221.
48 Id. at 2222; see also Claire McCusker, Comment, The Federalism Challenges of Impact
Litigation by State and Local Government Actors, 118 YALE L.J. 1557, 1566 (2009) (arguing
that localities should not pursue constitutional litigation in part because in so doing they under-
mine "the self-governance theory of federalism"); cf Samuel P. Tepperman-Gelfant, Note,
Constitutional Conscience, Constitutional Capacity: The Role of Local Governments in Pro-
tecting Individual Rights, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 219, 261-62 (2006) (arguing that local
governments should have leeway in some cases to sue to protect individual constitutional
rights). Michael Lawrence has made the opposite argument, namely, that cities should be able
to bring constitutional claims except those that challenge their state's internal political organi-
zation. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 115.
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onto neighboring localities. Thus, the overall effect of such cases is to un-
dermine rather than bolster local autonomy.
In Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage,*4
Schragger stakes out an even bolder localist position in the context of the
marriage cases. Schragger proposes that, rather than allowing localities to
enforce constitutional norms, the Court should permit them to make their
own local marriage eligibility determinations, thus granting them a measure
of "constitutional home rule." 0 He favors a "devolutionary constitutional
jurisprudence" in which each locality develops constitutional norms in keep-
ing with its own values."' Schragger, like Barron, dislikes that local consti-
tutional challenges seek to supplant local discretion with state and federal
constitutional norms.
Heather Gerken approaches the question of local challenges to state
action from a democratic theory rather than a local government law perspec-
tive in Dissenting by Deciding.52 She begins by articulating precisely why
local constitutional challenges trigger cognitive dissonance, namely, that a
local constitutional challenge is a form of dissent. Because the classic form
of dissent in our democracy is speaking truth to power (i.e., standing outside
and shaking one's fist at city hall), "we have trouble envisioning dissent
taking the form of [government] action,"" that is, "speak[ing] truth with
power."5 4 She goes on to explain that acts of "decisional dissent," such as
local constitutional challenges to state governmental action, are a predictable
side-effect of a political system that disaggregates decision-making:
"Where an institution [such as a state] is disaggregated, the power of the
polity-by which I mean the political community whose governing systems
include that institution-is parceled out to a number of smaller decisionmak-
ing bodies.""
Under these circumstances, Gerken argues, courthouse duels between
and among different levels of decision-making bodies should not surprise or
alarm us. Indeed, we may come to value decisional dissent for the same
reasons we value conventional dissent: "[I]t can contribute to the market-
place of ideas, engages electoral minorities in the project of self-governance,
and facilitates self-expression." 6 She posits that if "[i]n the long run . . .
disagreement is consistently embraced as a public act rather than shunted off
to the private realm, it may help us think of dissent as an everyday act of
citizenship rather than as an act of disaffiliation." 7
49 Schragger, supra note 30.
o Id. at 167-77. Schragger also argues that the Court's ruling in Roner v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), may require this result. See also Rosenthal, supra note 12.
si Schragger, supra note 30, at 152.
52 Gerken, supra note 45, at 1748.
3 Id. at 1747.
' Id. at 1750 (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 1755.
56 Id. at 1749 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 1779.
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II. THE HUNTER DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Doctrines of local powerlessness have been with us for so long, and are
so deeply embedded in local government theory, that they have come to
seem "natural."5 8 It is perhaps equally natural to presume that the Supreme
Court embraced the Hunter doctrine at the first opportunity and has applied
it with fervor ever since. In fact, that is not the case. Instead, if one were to
graph the Hunter doctrine's trajectory in the Court, it would resemble an
arch. The Court was slow to embrace the Hunter doctrine; it discussed and
developed that doctrine for 88 years before committing to it in 1923. It only
applied that doctrine with full force for ten years, from 1923 to 1933. Then,
after 1933, the Court dropped the Hunter doctrine sub silentio. Neverthe-
less, that doctrine is well worth examining because it is alive and well in the
lower federal and state courts.
A. Local Constitutional Challenges Before Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh (1907)
The Supreme Court first addressed whether a locality could invoke the
Constitution against its own state in 1845, in Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co.5 9 Baltimore & Ohio argued that Washington County, Mary-
land could not enforce a state statute requiring railroad companies to pay $1
million to benefit the county because the legislature had repealed the statute.
The county responded that the statute was a "contract" that the legislature
could not repeal without violating the Constitution's prohibition against the
impairment of contracts.60 The Court rejected that argument on the merits.'
Yet, notably, it also took the time to articulate (in dicta) a nascent theory of
local governmental identity:
[The county commissioners] are a corporate body, it is true, and
the members who compose it are chosen by the people of the
county.. .. [But] however chosen, their powers and duties depend
upon the will of the legislature, and are modified and changed, and
the manner of their appointment regulated at the pleasure of the
state.... The several counties are nothing more than certain por-
tions of territory into which the state is divided for the more con-
5 See generally Frug, supra note 9.
59 44 U.S. 534 (1845). The Court laid the groundwork for the Hunter line of cases in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), in which it announced what
would become a critical legal distinction between private and public corporations and ruled
that the former could invoke the Contracts Clause. See Barron, supra note 11, at 497-505.
aU.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 44 U.S. at 546-48, 553.
6' The Court ruled against Washington County on the ground that the 1836 statute was not
a "contract" for purposes of federal constitutional law. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 44 U.S. at
553.
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venient exercise of the powers of government. They form together
one political body in which the sovereignty resides.6 2
This passage was the Court's first articulation of what, over time, would
become the dominant federal view of the relationship between state and lo-
cal government: (1) A state's sovereignty "resides" in its "political body,"
or state government; (2) the "pleasure of the state" is expressed via "the will
of the legislature"; and (3) local governments are nothing more than agents
of state governments.
Five years later, in 1850, the Court decided Town of East Hartford v.
Hartford Bridge Co. 63 In that case, East Hartford argued (as had Washington
County before it) that the Connecticut legislature could not repeal a state
statutory right without violating the Constitution's Contracts Clause. Again,
the Court reached, and denied relief on, the merits, and similarly noted, in
dicta, that as a subdivision of the state the town was "under the control of
[state] legislation."6
Twenty-six years after Town of East Hartford, the Court handed down
Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas.65 In that case, the
county argued that the Indiana legislature could not redistribute local tax
dollars without violating the Constitution's Contracts66 and Takings
Clauses.67 Although the Tippecanoe County Court addressed and rejected
the County's claims on the merits, 68 the opinion was noteworthy for two
reasons.
First, it revealed the Court's unspoken analytical conflict over how to
address local constitutional challenges. The Court opined, on the one hand,
that municipalities are by "nature" "mere instrumentalities of the State, for
the convenient administration of government" and thus cannot invoke the
Constitution against their States.69 But, on the other hand, it stated that
county property other than tax revenue was "protected by all the guards
against legislative interference possessed by individuals and private corpora-
tions for their property," suggesting that, in some circumstances, localities
can invoke the Constitution against their states.7 0
Second, the Tippecanoe County Court repeated earlier language from
Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., in which it treated the concepts
of "State" and "legislature" as interchangeable: "Municipal corporations
62 Id. at 550.
63 51 U.S. 511 (1850).
6 Id. at 536 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 660-6 1).
- 93 U.S. 108 (1876).
6U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Tippecanoe Cnty., 93 U.S. at 114.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
68 The county argued, unsuccessfully, that (1) the County's charter constituted a "con-
tract" that the state legislature could not impair; and (2) the County's general fund constituted
"property" that the state could not take. See Tippecanoe Cnty., 93 U.S. at 112.
69 Id. at 114.70 Id. at 115.
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are mere instrumentalities of the State, for the convenient administration of
government; and their powers may be qualified, enlarged, or withdrawn, at
the pleasure of the legislature."71 The Court thus assumed that if the sover-
eign state has the power to do a particular thing, the state government/legis-
lature has that power. Though incorrect as a matter of state constitutional
law, this assumption persists throughout the Hunter line of cases.
In the period between 1889 and 1900, the Court issued a series of opin-
ions that zigzagged between addressing state/local constitutional conflicts on
the merits without discussing the status of local governments and slowly but
surely moving towards a comprehensive federal doctrine of local govern-
mental powerlessness. 72 But beginning in 1905, the Court solidified the offi-
cial federal doctrine of local government powerlessness and constitutional
invisibility. In City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway
Co., various Massachusetts localities challenged a state statute that released
a private railroad company from contractual obligations to localities.73 Un-
like earlier cases in which the Court reached the merits of the localities'
federal constitutional claims, in Worcester the Court assumed the existence
of an otherwise meritorious constitutional claim yet denied the cities relief.7 4
Similarly, in Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey," a school board resisted reor-
ganization under state law on the ground that it violated the Contracts, Due
Process, and Republican Form of Government Clauses. The Court tersely
dismissed the board's arguments, stating that because state legislatures create
school boards they may operate them without constitutional interference. 76
" Id. at 114 (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 44 U.S. 534,
550 (1845).
72 In Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U.S. 189 (1889), City of Covington v. Kentucky, 173
U.S. 231 (1899), and Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328 (1900), the Court rejected a wide range
of local constitutional claims on the merits without even questioning the localities' authority to
pursue those claims. In Williamson, the New Jersey township of North Brunswick argued that
the state had violated its rights under the Contracts and Due Process Clauses by repealing a
particular statute. 130 U.S. at 197-99. The Court held that the prior statute did not create a
contract, nor was North Brunswick's taxing power a property interest for purposes of the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 199-200. The Court conspicuously did not question the city's inherent
authority to pursue constitutional claims against its own state. In City of Covington, the Court
rejected a city's impairment of contract argument on the merits without questioning or even
mentioning the power of localities or their relationship to the states. 173 U.S. at 243. In
Mason, the Court rejected a city's argument under the Equal Protection Clause on the merits
without questioning its underlying authority to bring that claim. Mason, 179 U.S. at 335. By
contrast, during the same period the Court decided two state-local constitutional conflicts in
which it reached the merits of the claim, but noted local powerlessness. See City of New
Orleans v. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 89 (1891); Essex Pub. Rd. Bd. v.
Skinkle, 140 U.S. 334, 342 (1891).
1 City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 539-40 (1905).
74 Embracing the dicta from Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., Tippecanoe County, and William-
son, the Worcester Court ruled that, as a matter of federal law, municipal corporations are
"creature[s] of the state," created by the legislature, and consequently unable to challenge
legislative acts under the Constitution. Id. at 548-50.
" Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
76 Id. at 238-39.
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B. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh (1907)
In 1907, the Court decided Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,7 7 the most fa-
mous case to address the constitutional status of localities vis-A-vis their
states. Hunter considered whether the residents of one locality could chal-
lenge their state's decision to shift local boundaries and thereby merge them
with another locality." The Hunter plaintiffs were individuals, not local
public entities, and their constitutional claims could have been dispatched on
the merits. However, the Court used the occasion not only to announce the
Constitution's supposed indifference to intra-state political organization, but
also to restate its view of localities as politically derivative and constitution-
ally impotent:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, cre-
ated as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmen-
tal powers of the state as may be intrusted [sic] to them... . The
number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these
corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised
rests in the absolute discretion of the state. . . . The state, there-
fore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may
take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in
other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the
whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter
and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally
or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or
even against their protest.79
As this language illustrates, the Hunter Court essentially conjured a
federal common law definition of what localities are, and, based on that,
what they can and cannot do. And critically, the Court called upon the lower
federal courts to invoke the federal rule of local powerlessness "wherever
. . . applicable." 0
C. Local Constitutional Challenges from 1908 to 1933
Somewhat surprisingly, for two decades after the Court decided Hunter
it did not invoke the case to categorically ban local constitutional challenges.
Instead, it continued to decide such claims on the merits, which suggests
ambivalence." However, in 1923 the Court applied the Hunter doctrine to
" Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).7 Id. at 177.
79 Id. at 179.
80 Id. at 177-78.
11 In the first case to ban local constitutional challenges on the merits, City of Chicago v.
Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1911), the Court ruled that a statute requiring cities and coun-
ties to pay for damage caused by mob riots did not violate the federal Equal Protection or Due
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bar a pair of companion cases in which the cities of Trenton and Newark
brought constitutional challenges against a New Jersey statute governing
water rights.82 Trenton argued that the state statute violated its rights under
the Takings, Contracts, and Due Process Clauses,83 while Newark challenged
it under the Equal Protection Clause. 4 In sweeping language, the Court in
City of Trenton ruled that the Hunter doctrine categorically bars constitu-
tional claims by localities against their states." In City of Newark, the
Court-citing City of Trenton-declined to address the merits of that city's
equal protection claim.86
Finally, in 1933, the Court in Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore barred a
city's constitutional challenge to a state statute exempting a railroad from
taxation." The Court's discussion of the constitutional question consisted, in
its entirety, of two sentences:
There is error in the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals that
the statute of Maryland creating this exemption is a denial to the
respondents of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. A
municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of
government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal
Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its
creator. 8
D. Local Constitutional Challenges from 1934 to the Present
Williams represents the Hunter doctrine's high-water mark in the Su-
preme Court. After that case, the Court abruptly, and without explanation,
returned to its pre-Hunter practice of considering local constitutional claims
on the merits. Indeed, in the seventy-eight years since Williams, the Court
has not invoked the Hunter doctrine to bar a single local constitutional chal-
Process Clauses. In the second, City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394,
397 (1919), the Court rejected, seemingly in part on the merits, a city's challenge to a statute as
having violated the Contracts Clause. In the third, City of Boston v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309,
313 (1922), a city argued that a statute requiring it to levy certain taxes and turn them over to
the state violated the Contracts and Due Process Clauses. As in City of Chicago, the Court
seemed to reject Boston's claims in part on the merits and in part on intrinsic powers grounds.
Id. at 314-16.
82 See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); City of Newark v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 192 (1923).
83 City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 183.
8 City of Newark, 262 U.S. at 195.
8 See City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 186-92 ("A municipality is merely a department of the
state, and the state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. How-
ever great or small its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the state exercising and
holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will.").
86 See City of Newark, 262 U.S. at 196 ("The city cannot invoke the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment against the state.").
8 Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
8 Id. at 40.
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lenge to state action; instead, it has reached the merits of multiple local con-
stitutional challenges to state action with little or no mention of Hunter.9
Paradoxically, although the Court seems to have lost interest in the
Hunter doctrine, it has not lost interest in Hunter's general federal rule of
local powerlessness. Instead, without explanation or discussion, the Court
has invoked Hunter in some cases and ignored it in others. As Richard
Schragger puts it, the Court makes local governments "disappear and reap-
pear at will.""
To illustrate, in 1977 the Court faced the question of whether an Ohio
school district was part of state government for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment.91 In deciding that question, the Court ignored Hunter, re-
viewed state law to determine what Ohio school districts "are," and found
they are not part of state government. 92 Fourteen years later, in 1991, the
Court was asked to decide whether a town was part of state government for
purposes of interpreting a particular federal statute.93 Ignoring state law and
citing Hunter, the Court ruled that towns are "components of," and thus
legally indistinguishable from, their states.94 Six years later, in 1997, the
Court turned back to state law to determine whether a county sheriff was a
county or state employee for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.91 The Court said
that was not an "all or nothing" question, answered it under state law, and
ignored Hunter.96 Twelve years later, in 2009, the Court embraced Hunter
and ignored state law while determining whether, for First Amendment pur-
poses, localities are part of state government. 97
Schragger has written that "[t]he malleability of local government sta-
tus is convenient; it means that local institutions are readily deployed in the
service of political ends, most often by being treated as invisible until called
in to serve as a check on some uncongenial exercise of centralized power." 8
Perhaps Hunter's convenience partly explains why the Court has not over-
ruled it.
9 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
* Schragger, supra note 5, at 415-16 (explaining his view that the Supreme Court makes
localities appear and disappear in the same case for the sake of political convenience).
" Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
92 Id. at 279-81.
9' Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
94 Id. at 607-08.
s McMillan v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
96 Id. at 784-96.
" Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 363-64 (2009).
98 Schragger, supra note 5, at 416.
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III. THE CASE THAT ERIE FORGOT
A. Erie, Hunter, and Categorical Confusion
The Court decided Hunter in 1907, more than three decades before Erie
v. Tompkins, which famously did away with all "federal general common
law."" At face value, Hunter announced a "federal general common law"
rule of the type that Erie later extinguished. The Hunter Court announced
that it intended to define the "nature of municipal corporations," "to be
acted upon wherever [it is] applicable."'0 But of course, neither the Con-
stitution nor any other body of federal law grants the Court-or, for that
matter, any branch of the federal government-the authority to define locali-
ties or determine how power is allocated within the several States. Such
authority belongs to the People of the several States; their fifty state consti-
tutions "design democracy" sub-nationally.10' It is difficult to square
Hunter's disregard of state constitutional designs in favor of a federal gen-
eral common law rule with the principle announced in Erie.102
No court or scholar has revisited Hunter in light of Erie. But after Erie,
the lower courts have had a terrible time categorizing the Hunter doctrine.
Their confusion makes a certain amount of sense. After all, the Hunter doc-
trine's logic relies entirely on Hunter's general rule of local powerlessness;
the Hunter doctrine was not designed to, and does not, fit comfortably
within other federal doctrines.
Two federal appellate courts interpret the Hunter doctrine as a standing
doctrine.103 The Ninth Circuit has gone the furthest by interpreting the
Hunter doctrine as jurisdictional and allowing it to be raised for the first
99 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state. . . . There is no federal general common law. . . . [N]o clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power [to declare substantive rules of common law] upon the federal
courts.").
100 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). The Court continues to follow
Hunter's call to incorporate its view of localities as mere instrumentalities of state governments
wherever it may be applicable. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
607-08 (1991); Ysursa, 555 U.S at 363-64.
o' ROBERT F. WILLIAMs, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONs 17-18 (2009)
(quoting CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONs Do (2001)).
102 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting Justice Holmes as accusing federal courts that create
and impose general federal common law of committing "an unconstitutional assumption of
powers" reserved to the states).
103 See e.g. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (bar-
ring Fourteenth Amendment and Supremacy Clause claims); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. 1998) (barring Supremacy Clause,
Commerce Clause, and Due Process Clause claims); Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996) (barring Supremacy Clause claim); City of S. Lake
Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980) (barring Fourteenth
Amendment claim); see also Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2010) (barring Equal
Protection Clause claim); Hous. Auth. of the Kaw Tribe of Indians v. City of Ponca City, 952
F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991) (barring Fourteenth Amendment claim).
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time on appeal.'"0 Moreover, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have not only
fully embraced but also expanded the Hunter doctrine: The Ninth Circuit
has suggested that the Hunter doctrine bars localities from pursuing federal
statutory as well as constitutional claims against their states; 0 and both cir-
cuits bar localities from pursuing constitutional claims against other
localities. 106
By contrast, five federal and state appellate courts interpret the Hunter
doctrine as a substantive constitutional law doctrine, although they do not
agree on its scope. 07 The Second Circuit interprets the Hunter doctrine as
barring only Fourteenth Amendment claims. 0 The Fifth Circuit and the
California Supreme Court read the Hunter doctrine as prohibiting all of the
substantive constitutional claims the Court has barred.'tm The Sixth Circuit
and the Arizona Supreme Court read the Hunter doctrine much more nar-
rowly, as barring only intra-state political boundary disputes.o10 In other
words, the lower federal and state courts are all over the place when it comes
to categorizing the Hunter doctrine.
B. Categorizing the Hunter Doctrine After Erie
The lower courts' confusion leads to the question of which modem legal
category best suits the Hunter doctrine after Erie. To consider that question,
we must start with the basics. Any plaintiff that wishes to pursue a constitu-
'0 Palomar Pomerado Health Sys., 180 F.3d at 1106 (holding that standing is a necessary
element of federal court jurisdiction, citing South Lake Tahoe, 625 F.2d at 233, and that
"[uinder established Ninth Circuit law, '[p]olitical subdivisions of a state may not challenge
the validity of a state statute' in a federal court on federal constitutional grounds" (quoting City
of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973))).
"o' Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist., 91 F.3d 1240 (barring claims under both
the Supremacy Clause and the Federal Impact Aid Law, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1994)).
'" Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 136 F.3d 1360; Hous. Auth. of the Kaw
Tribe of Indians, 952 F.2d 1183. Taken together, these two Circuits' approaches mean that
local governments and their constituents in fifteen States-Alaska, Arizona, California, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming-are almost entirely shut out of local constitutional
enforcement.
'0 See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Hunter as an
annexation case); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979) (allowing Supremacy
Clause claim to proceed on the merits); Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (barring Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim); City of Tucson v. Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d 650 (Ariz. 2001) (interpreting the Hunter
doctrine as applying only to intra-state political boundary disputes); Star-Kist Foods v. Cnty.
of Los Angeles, 719 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1986) (allowing Commerce Clause challenge to proceed
on the merits).
'" Richardson, 473 F.2d at 929 (holding that political subdivisions of a state may not
challenge the validity of a state statute under the Fourteenth Amendment).
109 See Rogers, 588 F.2d 1057 (allowing Supremacy Clause claim to proceed on the mer-
its); Star-Kist Foods, 719 P.2d 987 (allowing Commerce Clause challenge to proceed on the
merits).
no Carlyn, 726 F.2d 287; Pima Cnty., 19 P.3d 650. The Fourth Circuit, meanwhile, has
thrown up its hands. That court said that it finds the Hunter doctrine to be unintelligible and
went on to address the claims at issue. City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 57
F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1995).
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tional claim in federal court must meet the following threshold requirements:
(1) It must be able to state a claim under the provision(s) it invokes;"' (2) it
must have the inherent legal authority, or "capacity," to pursue that particu-
lar claim;"l2 and (3) it must have Article III standing to pursue that claim."'
Each inquiry is both precise and distinct."14 As we have seen, courts and
scholars have variously categorized the Hunter doctrine as a substantive
constitutional doctrine,"' a standing doctrine," 6 and a capacity doctrine."'
These possibilities are considered in turn.
1. A Question of Substantive Constitutional Law?
One way to categorize the Hunter doctrine is as a substantive constitu-
tional doctrine, that is, a doctrine impliedly appended to one or more sub-
stantive constitutional provisions. Courts and scholars who take this view
interpret the Hunter doctrine at differing levels of breadth."8 At its narrow-
est substantive application, the Hunter doctrine could mean that neither lo-
calities nor their constituents have a constitutional right to particular intra-
state political boundaries.' '9 At its broadest application, the Hunter doctrine
"' See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
112 Id.
"3 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (describing the "irreducible minimum" requirements to establish
standing to sue).
"4 For clarity's sake, it is worth pausing to recall the distinction between "City Cases" and
"Constituent Cases." See discussion supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. A locality
seeking to pursue a city case must establish standing to sue on its own behalf, see, e.g., Bd. of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 240 (1968), while a locality seeking to bring a constituent case
must establish associational standing to sue on behalf of its constituents. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (city filed suit to protect privacy rights of patients); Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 341-45 (1977).
"I See, e.g., Frug, supra note 9, at 1065 (stating that the Hunter doctrine bars contract,just compensation, due process, and equal protection claims); Lawrence, supra note 12 (argu-
ing that the principles in Hunter should apply only to certain equal protection and due process
claims).
"6 See, e.g., City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231,
233-34 (9th Cir. 1980); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100 (2d Cir. 1973); Williams
v. Mayor of Bait., 289 U.S. 36, 47 (1933) (holding that local officials lacked "standing to
invoke the protection of the Federal Constitution"); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441
(1933) ("Being but creatures of the State, municipal corporations have no standing to invoke
the contract clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in oppo-
sition to the will of their creator."); Barron, supra note 2, at 2232; Brian P. Keenan, Note,
Subdivisions, Standing and the Supremacy Clause: Can a Political Subdivision Sue Its Parent
State Under Federal Law?, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1899 (2005); Case Comment, Township of
River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 83 HARV. L. REv. 679, 682 (1970). But see Rogers v.
Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1068-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting "standing" as a category for the
Hunter doctrine).
"' See, e.g., Tepperman-Gelfant, supra note 48; Harold A. Olsen, Note, Procedural Barri-
ers to Suits Against the State by Local Government, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 431 (1996).
"' See discussion, infra Part V.B.
"' See Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1984); City of Tucson v. Pima
Cnty., 19 P.3d 650 (Ariz. 2001).
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could read a substantive "no local governments allowed" component into
every provision of the Constitution.
The problem is that neither of these interpretations fully accounts for
how the Court has actually applied the Hunter doctrine. The narrow inter-
pretation does not square with the fact that the Court has applied the Hunter
doctrine to bar a very wide swath of economic, civil rights, and structural
constitutional claims, including those brought to enforce the prohibitions
against takingsl20 and the impairment of contracts,121 the guarantees of due
process 22 and equal protection,'23 and the guarantee of a republican form of
government.124
The broadest constitutional interpretation also seems implausible, for
two reasons. First, the Constitution says nothing about the nature, status,
roles, or powers of local public entities. One could argue that this is why the
Court is right to treat localities as constitutionally invisible. But one could
just as easily argue that the Founders weren't thinking about localities at all,
so they could not have specifically intended to make them strangers to the
Constitution. Second, a broad interpretation of the Hunter doctrine seems
unsatisfactory because it does not square with Court cases allowing localities
to bring constitutional claims against public entity defendants other than
their own states, such as the federal government and other state govern-
ments.'25 For these reasons, the Hunter doctrine resists classification as a
substantive constitutional law doctrine.
120 See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
121 City of Trenton, 262 U.S. 182; City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Str. Ry. Co., 196
U.S. 539 (1905); Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
2 City of Trenton, 262 U.S. 182; Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233.
123 Williams v. Mayor of Balt., 289 U.S. 36, 48 (1933); City of Newark v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 192 (1923).
124 Lowrey, 199 U.S. at 239 (holding that the power of the state legislature to create and
alter school districts is compatible with the republican form of government guaranteed by
Article IV).
125 For example, the Court has considered on the merits whether the U.S. government
denied a city its rights under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, United States v. 50 Acres
of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984), and whether a State had violated the Commerce Clause and
thereby injured a city in a neighboring state, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
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2. A Question of Standing to Sue? 26
Another view of the Hunter doctrine is that it addresses standing to sue.
Generally speaking, the U.S. Supreme Court divides standing into two sub-
parts: (1) Article III standing, and (2) prudential standing.127
Article III standing, which embodies constitutional limits on the exer-
cise of federal jurisdiction, seeks to ensure that the plaintiff bringing a par-
ticular claim has a concrete injury that can be traced to the conduct
complained of and can be redressed by a court.128 The Hunter doctrine can-
not be easily categorized as an Article III doctrine. To begin with, not all of
the local public entities in the Hunter line of cases were even claimants;
some invoked the Constitution only defensively, as a shield against statutory
claims.129 Additionally, in cases where the Court barred localities from pur-
suing constitutional claims, the localities appeared handily to meet baseline
Article III criteria.o
That brings us to prudential standing, a more promising post-Erie cate-
gory for the Hunter doctrine. Prudential standing embodies certain "judi-
cially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.""' The
Court has invoked prudential standing to avoid reaching the merits in four
general circumstances: (1) The plaintiff seeks to raise another's rights;'32 (2)
the plaintiffs alleged injury lies outside the so-called "zone of interests"
126 offer two caveats. First, in the decades since the Court decided Hunter and
announced the Hunter doctrine, federal standing doctrine has undergone revolutionary change.
This article subjects the Hunter doctrine to modem legal understandings because courts so
often apply standing doctrines in an effort to explain it. See, e.g., Indian Oasis-Baboquivari
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing City of S. Lake Tahoe v.
Cal. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980)). Second, this Article does
not purport to present a comprehensive discussion of standing or capacity, or even local
governmental standing or capacity. But it is worth discussing the Hunter doctrine's
misclassification because it provides evidence of Hunter's overreach into matters properly left
to state law.
1 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
128 Id. at 11-12; see also Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv.
459, 465 (2008).
129 See, e.g., Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233.
130 See, e.g., Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 48 (1933) (challenging a state
statute exempting a railroad from local taxation); City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192
(1923) (challenging state statute affecting city's water rights under the Equal Protection
Clause); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (challenging state statute affect-
ing city's water rights under Takings, Contracts, and Due Process Clauses); City of Worcester
v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539 (1905) (challenging under the Contracts Clause
state's decision to release private railroad company from contractual obligation to municipal
governments).
"' Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Elk
Grove Court explained that though the Court has not exhaustively defined the prudential
dimensions of the standing doctrine, it typically encompasses "the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement
that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked." Id.
at 12 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
132 Id.
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covered by the legal provision at issue;133 (3) resolving the dispute would
require the Court to address sensitive questions of state law;'34 and/or (4) the
conflict would be best resolved politically rather than in the courts. 3
It would seem difficult to explain the Hunter doctrine's categorical ban
on all local constitutional claims according to the first three prudential con-
cerns. The Supreme Court and several lower courts have barred constitu-
tional claims even when localities are attempting to assert their own
institutional interests (that is, pursuing what I call "City Cases"). Further,
they have done so under federal constitutional law to remedy injuries that
appear to fall within the so-called "zone of interests" at issue in the case."'
But what about the fourth prudential concern, that the Court should
decline jurisdiction when the underlying dispute presents a political ques-
tion? At first glance, this seems a more promising justification for a ban on
local constitutional enforcement, and at least one court has seized on the
political question rubric to explain the Hunter doctrine.' Employing simple
logic, one could imagine the Court thinking about this problem in one of
several ways. The Court could refrain from exercising jurisdiction over
state-local constitutional disputes based on the relationship between the par-
ties (locality vs. state), the nature of the claims (constitutional vs. not), the
nature of the forum (judicial vs. political), or some combination of these
factors.
First, one could imagine the Court declining to decide these cases due
to the relationship between the parties. The argument would be that the fed-
eral courts should stay out of legal disputes between localities and their
states. However, that argument fails to explain the Hunter doctrine, because
the Court does not have a rule categorically barring localities from bringing
non-constitutional claims against their states."' If the Hunter doctrine
turned on the relationship between the parties, we would expect it to bar all
state-local legal disputes, not just constitutional disputes.
Second, one could imagine the Court declining to decide these cases
due to the nature of the claims. The argument would be that localities sim-
13 Id. The so-called "zone of interests" test is an opaque requirement that purports to
ensure that a plaintiff who has satisfied Article III is a proper party to invoke judicial resolu-
tion of the dispute. See also Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause: Why the "Zone of Interests" Test Should Not Apply to Constitutional Cases, 48
ARIz. L. REv. 23, 34 (2006). It is not clear this test applies to constitutional claims. See id. at
35-44.
134 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12.
"I Heather Elliott has explained that this final inquiry is sometimes grouped under a jus-
ticiability doctrine known as the "political question" doctrine. See Elliott, supra note 128, at
462 n.8, 465.
136 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
17See City of Jersey City v. Farmer, 746 A.2d 1018, 1021 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000).
3 For example, the Court has considered on the merits whether states can commandeer
federal funds granted to localities. Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1,
469 U.S. 256 (1985).
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ply cannot bring constitutional claims into federal court. But that argument
also does not explain the Hunter doctrine because the Court does not have a
rule categorically barring local constitutional claims against defendants other
than the plaintiffs own state.'39 If the Hunter doctrine turned on the nature
of the claims, we would expect it to bar all local constitutional challenges,
not just challenges to states.
Third, the Court could refrain from addressing the merits of the claim
based on the notion that local-state constitutional disputes present political
rather than judicial questions. 140 In the context of the Hunter doctrine, this
"political question" argument has horizontal and vertical dimensions.
The horizontal argument would be that local-state constitutional dis-
putes are best left to the (federal and/or state) political branches and that no
court should go near them. However, this argument cannot explain Hunter
because it clashes with so much of state law. In most states, local-state
constitutional disputes are treated as justiciable. Of the fifty states, only sev-
enteen prohibit localities from bringing state constitutional challenges into
court, and the majority of those rely on Hunter.141 These cases have a certain
dog-chases-its-tail quality: If the logic of Hunter collapses, those cases col-
lapse unless they can be justified by some other, legitimate doctrine. Of the
remaining thirty-three states, fourteen permit some or all such challenges,142
and nineteen have not addressed the question. 143 If a great many states be-
lieve that, as a category, local-state constitutional disputes belong in court,
how can the federal courts reasonably hold the opposite, even as to disputes
involving those states?
The vertical component of the political question argument would be
that the U.S. Constitution should respect state sovereignty by declining to
step between localities and their states. This argument might find allies
among process federalists, who favor the preservation of state and local au-
1' For example, the Court has considered on the merits whether the U.S. government
denied a city its rights under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. United States v. 50 Acres
of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984). The Court has also considered whether a State violated the
Commerce Clause and thereby injured a city in a neighboring state. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
'" See, e.g., Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 226 F. Supp.
456 (S.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 837 (1965).
141 Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Kathleen S. Morris, States on Constitutional
Enforcement, http://www.harvardcrcl.org/morris-states-on-constitutional-enforcement. These
holdings are doctrinally suspect to the extent they borrow Hunter's questionable logic.
142 Those states are Alabama, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. See
id.
143 Those states are Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id.
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thority to legislate policy choices free of federal interference.144 However,
this argument also fails to explain Hunter because, again, the Court has
never announced a procedural bar to other types of state-local legal con-
flicts.145 Since constitutional law is supreme, it would defy logic to rule, per
the political question doctrine, that federal statutory disputes between locali-
ties and their states are justiciable, but federal constitutional disputes be-
tween the same entities are not.146 In sum, none of the standing or related
justiciability doctrines satisfactorily explain the Hunter doctrine.
If it wanted to, the Court certainly could create a new prong under the
prudential standing doctrine that bars local constitutional claims, but it has
not yet done so. Instead, to the extent the Court has applied the Hunter
doctrine, its sole justification is Hunter's general federal rule of local
powerlessness vis-h-vis state government. Accordingly, as things stand, the
Hunter doctrine does not neatly map onto prudential standing.
3. A Question of Capacity to Sue?
A third view of the Hunter doctrine is that it deals with capacity to
sue. 147 "Capacity [addresses whether] a party [has a] personal right to
come into court, and should not be confused with the question of whether a
party has an enforceable right or interest or is the real party in interest." 48 It
concerns, in sum, "the personal qualifications of a party to litigate. .. . 149
A party that lacks the inherent authority to sue is said to lack "capacity." In
a capacity inquiry, the focus is on the plaintiffs intrinsic characteristics. A
plaintiff may lack capacity to sue if, for example, she is not of sound mind,
has not reached a certain age, or is otherwise legally disabled.
Per the Court's own analysis in the Hunter line of cases, the Hunter
doctrine bars local constitutional enforcement because of the "nature" of
local governments. It bars localities from invoking the federal constitution
against their own states because of what they "are." They "are" "subdivi-
'" See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) ("The whole point of federalism ... is that,
because preferences for governmental policy are unevenly distributed among the states and
regions of the nation, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking. Federal-
ism is a way to capture this advantage, by assuring that federal policymakers leave suitable
decisions to be made in the first instance by state politicians in state institutions.").
145 See, e.g., Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 270
(1985) (holding that states cannot commandeer federal funds granted to localities by federal
statute).
' The courts are split on this question. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that the Hunter
doctrine also bars localities from invoking federal statutes against their own states. See Indian
Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (barring
claims under both the Supremacy Clause and the Federal Impact Aid Law, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 236-244 (1994)).
147 See Tepperman-Gelfant, supra note 48; Olsen, supra note 118.
14 8 6A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1559 (3d ed. 1998).
149 Id.
2012] 25
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
sions of the state";s 0 "creatures of the state";"' "mere instrumentalities of
the State, for the convenient administration of government." 5 2 As such,
they lack the necessary independence that is a precondition to alleging a
constitutional violation against their states. This type of analysis, which fo-
cuses on the plaintiffs intrinsic characteristics, maps better onto the doctrine
of capacity to sue than onto any substantive constitutional or standing
doctrine.
One might wonder whether, and why it matters whether, the Hunter
doctrine is about standing, substantive constitutional law, or capacity to sue.
It does matter, for the following reason. If the Hunter doctrine dealt with
either standing or substantive constitutional law, it would not be surprising
that the Court developed a federal common law rule addressing that subject,
since even after Erie, the Court is free to develop federal common law that is
tethered to the Constitution. But if the Hunter doctrine is about capacity to
sue, it is not just surprising but disturbing that courts invoke that doctrine to
bar local constitutional enforcement. Congress has directed the federal
courts to defer to, rather than trump, state law in deciding capacity questions,
and they typically do.'53 If the Hunter doctrine truly is about capacity to sue,
the lower federal courts overreach their authority every time they apply it.
The Court's decision in Erie sets the Hunter doctrine, and the rule of
local powerlessness, adrift. As lower court cases applying the Hunter doc-
trine attest, the courts lack a firm doctrinal and theoretical grasp on the na-
ture of localities and their place in our constitutional democracy.15 4
IV. WHY WE SHOULD NOT MOURN THE Loss OF HUNTER
A. Hunter's Conceptual Confusion
Courts and scholars are understandably reluctant to consider overruling
precedent. However, assuming Erie effectively overruled Hunter, we should
not mourn Hunter's loss because it was poorly reasoned from the start.
Hunter's general rule of local governmental powerlessness rests on three
foundational assumptions. They are: (1) A state's sovereignty inheres in its
government; (2) state legislatures originally created all local governments
and can abolish them at will, even over the objection of the People; and (3)
local governments act solely as instrumentalities of state governments.
150 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are
political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to them.").
"' City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 549 (1905).
152 Bd. of Comm'rs of Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 114 (1876); see also
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S 353, 363-64 (2009); Williams v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 289 U.S. 36, 48 (1933).
'13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
154 See Schragger, supra note 5, at 396 (describing localities as politically and "doctrinally
untethered").
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These assumptions constitute Hunter's analytic support structures. If they
fail, Hunter fails, so they warrant careful examination.
1. Hunter's First Assumption: A State's Sovereignty Inheres in Its
Government
This sovereignty discussion must begin with an important caveat. A
great deal of literature addresses which state entity or group constitutes "the
sovereign" for purposes of the relationship between the federal and state
governments."5 That question is undeniably one of federal constitutional
law.
By contrast, this Article and Hunter address the question of which state
entity or group constitutes "the sovereign" for purposes of the relationship
between localities and their states. That question is properly answered with
reference to state constitutional law.' 6 Accordingly, this Article's claims
about sovereignty are grounded entirely in state constitutional law, and in-
tended to be limited to the context of local government law. This Article
takes no position on whether state governments are "the sovereign state" for
purposes of federal law.
Hunter's first foundational assumption is that, for purposes of evaluat-
ing the local-state governmental relationship, a state's government is equal to
the sovereign state. The Hunter doctrine relies heavily on the concept of
sovereignty. Defining the term "sovereignty" is tricky because it has differ-
ent meanings in different contexts.' This Article defines "sovereign" for
Hunter purposes as the entity or actor(s) with ultimate authority in a given
constitutional framework."' The sovereign may delegate but never entirely
cedes power; it can always recover that which is delegated.15 9
"s For a discussion of state sovereignty in the federal context, see Amar, supra note 20, at
1435-38; see also Briffault, supra note 41, at 1309 ("Among scholars, a historical account of
the Constitution as a compact of the people of the United States has supplanted to a significant
degree the common understanding that the United States was formed out of a compact of the
states.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
56 See Amar, supra note 20, at 1435-38; WILLIAMS, supra note 101, at 32 ("The texts of
virtually all state constitutions proclaim their foundation in popular sovereignty . . . .").
117 See Gerken, supra note 34, at 13 (noting the opacity of the term "sovereignty" and
defining and applying a working definition of sovereignty for the purpose of that article).
'" See Eaton, supra note 21, at 442 ("[Tlhe people are the source of all legal power and
authority in the United States. Sovereignty is and remains in the people. The sovereign is the
person, or body of persons, over whom there is politically no superior.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
' California's Proposition 8 provides an illustration of this shifting power dynamic. In
2008, the California Supreme Court, which the state constitution charges with interpreting the
law, struck down California's marriage laws as unconstitutional. See In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). In direct response, a majority of California voters voted to overturn
that decision by amending the state constitution. CAL. CONsr. ar. 1, § 7.5 (added by Initiative
Measure (Prop. 8, § 2, approved Nov. 4, 2008, eff. Nov. 5, 2008)). See Strauss v. Horton, 207
P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (upholding the validity of Proposition 8). In this manner, the People of
California (via the state constitution) delegated lawmaking to legislators and constitutional
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In the course of its analysis, the Hunter Court conflates state govern-
ment with the "sovereign state." In other words, Hunter assumes that state
governments are sovereign vis-A-vis localities. However, the idea that state
governments are sovereign in the manner Hunter describes is incorrect as a
matter of state constitutional law. The fifty state constitutions determine
which entity is "the sovereign" within the states.160 And all fifty state con-
stitutions identify the People-not their government-as sovereign in their
states. 161
The Court first equates state government with the sovereign State in
1845 in Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.:
[Counties] depend upon the will of the legislature, and are modi-
fied and changed, and the manner of their appointment regulated at
the pleasure of the state. . . . [They] are nothing more than certain
portions of territory in which the state is divided for the more con-
venient exercise of the powers of government.162
In this passage, the Court impliedly equates "the state" with the legisla-
ture; reduces counties to "nothing more than . . . [geographic] territory";
and presumes that since, at its pleasure, "the state" can "modif[y] or
change" local government, so can its legislature. The Court assumes state
governments are the sovereign state throughout the Hunter line of cases,
including Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas,163 City of
Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Co. ,'" and, of course,
Hunter v. Pittsburgh.165
Let us pause to consider what we might mean by the phrase "the state."
One could use that term to convey a number of ideas, including: (1) The
physical territory that makes up the state (state qua locus);166 (2) the collec-
tion of individuals who reside within that physical territory and consent to be
governed (state qua populus); (3) the state constitution, which declares that
the People are sovereign, and through which the People invent legal and
interpretation to the courts, but when it came down to deciding what the law of California
would be, they ultimately reasserted their sovereignty.
'6 See Eaton, supra note 21, at 442; see also Morris, supra note 141.
161 See Morris, supra note 141.
62 Maryland v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 44 U.S. 534, 550 (1845) (emphasis added).
163 93 U.S. 108, 114 (1876).
' 196 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905) (a municipal corporation is "the creature of the state,"
which "exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the state through its legislative depart-
ment"; it is "not only a part of the state, but is a portion of its governmental power") (empha-
sis added).
'6 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1905) ("In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative
body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any
provision of the Constitution of the United States.") (emphasis added). This conception of
localities has spread to a number of other doctrinal areas.
'1 See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Brif
fault, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1173, 1186 (1996).
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political structures and delegate power amongst them (state qua doctrina);'61
or (4) the state government, which consists of the state-level (as opposed to
local-level) institutions to which the People (via the state constitution) have
delegated a portion of their sovereign power (state qua ordinatio).
When we parse the idea of "the state" in this way, we see immediately
that under state constitutional law there is a world of difference between the
ultimate, sovereign authority of the state qua populus and the partial, dele-
gated, non-sovereign authority of the state qua ordinatio.'6 We see, further,
that the sovereign state has a great deal more power than the state legisla-
ture, a part of the government to which the People in all fifty states delegated
only a portion of the government's overall power. The Hunter doctrine's
assumption that a state's government is the sovereign state is thus its first
analytical misstep.169
This assumption helps to justify the Hunter doctrine because that case
suggests that a local constitutional claim against state government amounts
to an attack on the sovereign. To the contrary, a locality that brings such a
claim does so to defend the sovereign State (that is, the People and their
constitutional values) from allegedly renegade state actors." Regardless of
whether the reviewing court ultimately finds in the locality's favor, such a
claim is properly viewed as having been brought to champion and defend,
rather than attack, the sovereign.' 7'
2. Hunter's Second Assumption: State Legislatures Created and
Can Abolish Local Governments at Will
Hunter's second foundational assumption is that, as a categorical mat-
ter, state governments originally created all local governments and can abol-
ish them at will, even over the objection of the People. This creation myth
runs through many cases in the Hunter line, including City of Worcester v.
"7 See WI..AMS, supra note 101, at 3, 25 ("[S]tate constitutions owe their legal validity
and political legitimacy to the state electorate . . . ."). But see Baker & Rodriguez, supra note
9, at 1344-45 (arguing that, as a practical matter, state courts, not state constitutions, deter-
mine the vertical distribution of power within a state).
68 See Amar, supra note 20, at 1435-39, 1485.
16 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). This Article does not
address whether federal law should ever, for any purpose, treat state governments as the sover-
eign state.
'o See Amar, supra note 20, at 1427.
1' See id. at 1429. Amar's views on Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence have struggled
to gain traction in the Court. But regardless of how sovereignty is perceived for federal pur-
poses, one cannot deny that, pursuant to the state constitutions, in the states the people are
sovereign. In the context of determining whether within a particular state the people or the
government are sovereign, the federal courts ought not replace an established state constitu-
tional rule with an opposing federal doctrine.
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Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Co.,172 Hunter v. Pittsburgh,"73 and
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.174
As a matter of historical fact, our nation had local governments well
before it had state governments, states, or even colonies. To take just one
example, four original towns existed "before there was any Rhode Island.
They made it by their union." 7 1
More importantly, the idea that state governments created localities is
wrong as a matter of law. The original state constitutions presupposed the
existence of localities, just as the federal Constitution presupposed the exis-
tence of states.176 Almost without exception, the original state constitutions
acknowledged the pre-existence of local public entities, including but not
limited to counties, cities, towns, and townships. 7 Most went further, in
terms of direct delegation of power by creating certain localities and/or local
public officials,"' granting power directly to certain localities and/or locally
elected officials,179 and/or requiring local elections for certain local
positions. 10
And today, most state constitutions delegate to localities considerable
authority to determine their own powers and functions. Thus, as of our Na-
tion's founding, "the United States enjoyed three levels of successful [demo-
cratic] governmental operations-national, state, and local."'"' As a matter
of state constitutional law (not legislative discretion), localities in those
"2 196 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905) (explaining that a municipal corporation is "the creature
of the state," which "exists by virtue of the exercise of the power of the state through its
legislative department," and "[t]he legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the
corporation itself, and provide other and different means for the government of the district
comprised within the limits of the former city").
17 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the
state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
state as may be intrusted [sic] to them . . . . The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or
withdraw all such powers . . . . [T]his may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or
without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.").
174 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) ("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better
ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which
it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator.").
"7 Eaton, supra note 21, at 448; see also Herget, supra note 21, at 1001-02. As Herget
explains, "[t]he New England towns were very important units of government, more impor-
tant in some respects than the colonial or state government. Counties and townships in other
states performed like functions, and sixteen cities had received significant powers through
corporate charters by the time of the Revolution." Id.
"6 See Morris, supra note 19.
77 See id.
78 See id.
' See id.
'go See id.
18' Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determina-
tion, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 304 (1987) ("Both in fact and in law, the traditional description
of municipalities as 'mere instrumentalities of the State for the convenient administration of
their affairs,' is inaccurate. Since early colonial times, municipalities have served both as
administrative subunits carrying out state policy and as independent structures for local poli-
cymaking reflecting the will of the smaller community." (quoting Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith,
100 U.S. 514, 529 (1880))).
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states: Determine their own forms of government and internal organization;
decide what functions to perform; raise, borrow, and spend revenue; deter-
mine personnel policies; initiate policies independently; and claim immunity
from some state legislation.'82 It is therefore incorrect to treat localities as
state governmental creatures.
Nor can state legislatures categorically abolish local governments, as
Hunter would have it, "with or without the consent of the citizens, or even
against their protest.""' The People of a state may change local govern-
ments' constitutional status to curtail or expand local powers as they choose.
But once they have created, delegated power to, or presumed the existence
of a locality, the legislature must respect their constitutional existence and
the scope of their powers." The original state constitutions of nearly all
fifty states created, delegated power to, and/or presumed the existence of at
least one form of local office or government. Since then, many state consti-
tutions have added new localities or increased the powers of existing locali-
ties.' So, while the People in any state can eliminate all local governments,
there was never a time-and likely never will be-when a state's govern-
ment can constitutionally take that step.
One might reply that, since localities have no intrinsic (that is, extra-
constitutional) "right" to exist, the Court is right to declare them powerless.
But, of course, in our constitutional system no public entity-not even the
Court-has an extra-legal "right" to exist. Nor do private corporations have
an extra-legal "right" to exist. Yet the Court has not declared state or fed-
eral public entities, or private corporations, to be "powerless" vis-t-vis their
states, and for good reason. The mere fact that an entity did not "exist" in
the legal sense before a constitutional provision, legislative act, or executive
decision created it tells us next to nothing about the scope of its powers,
82 See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 1337-38, 1346-48, 1363, 1366-67; Michael
E. Libonati, Local Government Autonomy, 62 LA. L. REV. 97, 98 (2001) (summarizing U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AuTONOMY
(1993)).
183 WILLIAMS, supra note 101, at 3 ("A state constitution serves as a charter of law and
government for the state-the supreme law of the state-and prescribes in more or less detail
the structure and functions of state and, sometimes, local government."); see also G. ALAN
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 19-20, 62 (1998); Frank P. Grad, The State
Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 (1968).
1" See Owens v. Maze, 132 S.W.3d 874, 876 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that if the state
constitution presupposes the existence of a public entity, the state legislature lacks the author-
ity to abolish it; it can only be abolished by constitutional amendment); City of Gretna v.
Bailey, 75 So. 491, 498 (La. 1917) (ruling that legislature could not create a city court where
the state constitution established local justice of the peace courts); Holt v. Denny, 21 N.E. 274,
283 (Ind. 1889) (ruling that the Constitution's acknowledgement of localities implies that they
continue to have powers that preceded that document's drafting, and the legislature cannot
interfere with those powers notwithstanding its general power to enact legislation); Le Roy v.
Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871) (ruling that where the state constitution provided for the election
of certain local elected positions, the legislature lacked the authority to appoint those
positions).
18 See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 1337-38.
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roles in governance, or relationship to public entities. For that, one must
look to the applicable constitutional provision.
There is an irony here: The Hunter Court sought to respect states by
reducing localities to nothing. Yet, in reality, by creating a federal rule de-
fining the "nature" of all localities and their relationships to state govern-
ment, Hunter disrespected the states. It effectively supplanted state
constitutional law and history with a federally-invented creation myth.'8 6
3. Hunter's Third Assumption: Local Governments Are Mere
Instrumentalities of State Governments
The Hunter doctrine's third foundational assumption is that local public
entities are mere instrumentalities of state governments. By this logic, a
locality "is like a state administrative agency, serving the state in its narrow
area of expertise, but instead of being functional specialists, localities are
given jurisdictions primarily by territory, although certain local units are
specialized by function as well as territory."' Yet, scholarship in this area
has shown fairly decisively that the "state subdivision" conception of locali-
ties does not accurately describe localities' collective role in our national
life.' That idea is incorrect doctrinally and politically.
As a descriptive matter, David Barron has written that:
[The Hunter Court] ignored the degree to which local communi-
ties may provide the vital institutional context within which people
live their public lives in a constitutional democracy. A local com-
munity is not simply a type of state administrative agency to be
shaped at will to serve the need of the central state. It is, in a
fundamental sense, the locus for those human interactions that
comprise what we conceive to be democratic life in a constitu-
tional system committed to self-government.8 9
'" Hunter's irony turned to blasphemy after 1938, when the Court decided Erie. See
discussion supra Part Ill.
'" Briffault, supra note 12, at 8 (explaining Hunter's view on this point). Cases in the
Hunter line that reinforce this assumption include: Maryland v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 44
U.S. 534, 550 (1845) ("The several counties are nothing more than certain portions of territory
into which the state is divided for the more convenient exercise of the powers of government.
They form together one political body in which the sovereignty resides."); Bd. of Comm'rs of
Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, Ill (1876) (explaining that municipalities are "mere
instrumentalities of the State, for the convenient administration of government"); City of
Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905) ("[A] municipal
corporation is not only a part of the State, but is a portion of its governmental power.");
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmen-
tal powers of the state as may be intrusted [sic] to them.").
... See Barron, supra note 2, at 2243; Williams, supra note 10.
"' Barron, supra note I1, at 56-64.
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As a doctrinal matter, "no city is as thoroughly under the thumb of the
state as a matter of state law as the state creature metaphor suggests."'"
Instead, "cities enjoy a number of [state constitutional] protections from
state statutory attempts to restrict local lawmaking discretion."''
That is not to suggest, of course, that local officials never act as instru-
mentalities of state government; they do in some instances because their
actions are dictated by state law.192 But at other times they act as instrumen-
talities of their constituents. One way to make sense of this duality is to
consider the cases dividing "mandatory" from "discretionary" acts.' At
times, state law requires localities to take specific actions; in those moments,
localities are engaging in mandatory acts as agents of state government. At
other times, the People and/or legislature have left it to localities to make
their own policy choices. In the latter case, localities are engaging in discre-
tionary acts as agents of their constituents.
To take one high-profile example, in 2004, two San Francisco officials
challenged California's marriage laws in very different ways. First, the
Mayor ordered the County Clerk to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-
sex couples in violation of a state statute. Reviewing that order, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court essentially found that, in the course of administering the
state's marriage laws, county officials' 94 are engaged in mandatory acts on
behalf of state government. In that capacity, they were bound to follow state
law. 1
A few months later, the San Francisco City Attorney filed suit in state
court challenging the very same provisions of state law under the California
Constitution's privacy, equal protection and due process provisions.196 In
that instance, the Supreme Court did not question the City's authority to
challenge state law, and for good reason. Unlike the County Clerk, in filing
suit, the City Attorney was acting in his discretion as an agent of his constit-
uents, not as an agent of state government. 9
"9 Barron, supra note 2, at 2243.
" Id. at 2243 n.92 (citing papers by Gerald E. Frug, Richard Ford, Richard Briffault, and
Roderick Hills); see also Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 1337-38.
192 See, e.g., Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 96 P.3d 459, 473 (Cal. 2004).
'9 See, e.g., Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 2010).
194 San Francisco is both a city and a county. In California, counties administer state
marriage laws.
' See Lockyer, 96 P.3d at 473.
196 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). City Attorney Herrera was able to
file suit because California law permits localities to bring state constitutional challenges
against state governmental action. Herrera has since filed suit in federal court challenging
California's Proposition 8 under the U.S. Constitution. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). No party has questioned his standing to do so.
Joseph Blocher makes a parallel argument at the state level, namely, that when Attor-
neys General sue the U.S. Government under the Constitution they do so as agents of the
People of their State. See Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys
General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2011).
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Even the Court itself has parted ways with Hunter's logic on the ques-
tion of the role of localities. For example, in Avery v. Midland County,9 8
which established that "one person, one vote" applies to local elections, the
Court emphasized that localities play a quasi-independent role in our consti-
tutional democracy:
[I]n providing for the governments of their cities, counties, towns,
and districts, the States characteristically provide for representa-
tive government-for decision-making at the local level by repre-
sentatives elected by the people. And, not infrequently, the
delegation of power to local units is contained in constitutional
provisions for local home rule which are immune from legislative
interference.199
Similarly, as a political matter, elected local officials serve not one but
two masters. To reduce localities to arms of state government is to imagine
that local elections are irrelevant, that they are not an independent source of
power. But, of course, local elections do matter, and they convey indepen-
dent power. Unlike a state governmental actor assigned to a locality, elected
local officials answer not to some state official, but to the local electorate.
As Richard Briffault puts it:
[D]espite their formal status as political subdivisions of the state,
most general purpose local governments-counties and municipal-
ities-are primarily accountable to their local electorates. In prac-
tice, they function as representatives of local constituencies and
not field offices for state bureaucracies. 200
The Hunter doctrine would only make sense if localities acted exclu-
sively as instrumentalities of their state governments. Because localities also
act as units of representative democracy, the Hunter doctrine does not make
sense. 201
98 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968). For an excellent article discussing Avery's impact on
Hunter, see Briffault, supra note 2, at 347-48.
99 Avery, 390 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added); see Holt v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60,
79-88 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "a municipality exercises 'governing' and
'law-making' power over its police jurisdiction," creating a right to participate in the City's
political processes); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) ("[T]he Court has
never acknowledged that the States have power to do as they will with municipal corporations
regardless of consequences. Legislative control of municipalities, no less than other state
power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitu-
tion."); Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of Covington v. Ken-
tucky, 173 U.S. 231 (1899); Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); see also Neuman,
supra note 181, at 304.
20 Briffault, supra note 41, at 1318 (emphasis added); see also Briffault, supra note 2, at
347-48; Neuman, supra note 181, at 304.
201 See David J. Barron, The Promise of Tribe's City: Self-Government, the Constitution,
and a New Urban Age, 42 TULSA L. REv. 811, 812 (2007) (explaining that legal limits on local
governments are holding back their development). Discussing the federal-state relationship,
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have explained that state governments may also
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B. Why Hunter Matters
Hunter has contributed powerfully to a national political and legal cul-
ture that devalues and underutilizes local public entities.202 Localities have
enormous untapped potential as enforcers of constitutional norms and full
participants in law and policy debates. But treating localities as mere instru-
mentalities of state government, and categorically depriving them of full par-
ticipation in our nation's constitutional debates, relegates the nation's most
directly accessible and accountable democratic agents to third- or fourth-
place status, below not only the federal and state governments, but also be-
low private corporations, non-profit organizations, private associations, la-
bor unions, and the like.
Hunter also matters because it provides analytical support to the Hunter
doctrine, which operates to bar and chill most localities from enforcing the
Constitution either on behalf of themselves or their constituents. Absent
Hunter, a locality able to satisfy capacity and standing requirements, and
able to state a claim, could bring a Constituent Case to remedy overreach by
state government. And, absent Hunter, a locality could bring a City Case to
protect its own governmental or commercial interests. To take a few exam-
ples, it seems intuitively correct that, absent the Hunter doctrine, an injured
locality should be able to enforce the Supremacy 203 and Commerce
Clauses.204 In addition, since localities enter into contracts, they should be
protected by the Impairment of Contracts Clause. Since they own property,
they should be protected by the Due Process and Takings Clauses. Since
they are commonly plaintiffs and defendants in lawsuits, they should be pro-
tected by the clauses guaranteeing due process and trial by jury. Since they
oversee public expenditures, they should be able to invoke the Establishment
Clause.2 05
Finally, Hunter matters because-via the Hunter doctrine-it has cast
localities solely as violators, never champions, of constitutional norms. Af-
ter all, localities are sued every day for alleged constitutional violations. Al-
lowing localities to participate in constitutional litigation as plaintiffs as well
play different roles over time. They may act as "autonomous sovereigns" one moment, "co-
operative servants" the next, and rebels the next. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009). Bulman-Pozen and
Gerken refer to this third category as "uncooperative federalism." See id.; see also Herget,
supra note 21, at 1007 (noting that although it has been doctrinally convenient for courts to
view localities solely as ministerial arms of state government, they have also always exercised
independent power). The same analysis applies to localities, which, like states, wear multiple
hats. See Morris, supra note 24, at 52-53; see also Neuman, supra note 181, at 304.
202 In Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a
Federal System, Richard Schragger similarly argues that the deprivation of power can have a
deleterious effect on a locality's political culture. 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2545-46 (2006).
203 See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 133-34 (2004) (permitting a municipal-
ity to pursue a claim under the Supremacy Clause).
20 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (permitting a city to
pursue a constitutional claim against a neighboring state).
205 See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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as defendants would transform local public law offices into public interest
law firms that advance their constituents' views of constitutional norms.206
Right now, Hunter completely forecloses that possibility.
V. JOINING THE NORMATIVE DEBATE: SHOULD LOCALITIES ENFORCE
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS?
Two broad assumptions underlie this Article's policy discussion. First,
this Article assumes that, generally speaking, robust constitutional enforce-
ment is a good thing, so the law should err on the side of encouraging such
cases.2 07 One might reasonably argue that eliminating local constitutional
enforcement would serve judicial economy or that constitutional disputes are
best decided in political rather than judicial fora. These points, though worth
considering, are beyond the scope of this Article.208
Second, this Article does not promote a particular view of the Constitu-
tion or a substantive political agenda. It embraces no ideology other than the
belief that including local public entities in constitutional debates may serve
to strengthen those debates, along with the efficacy of local governments
and local public law offices. 209 Local politics and policy priorities would-
indeed, should-shape each locality's constitutional case docket. Atlanta's
docket would likely not resemble Chicago's, which would not resemble
Miami's, which would not resemble San Francisco's, and so on. After all,
cities, counties, and other local governments can be "laboratories," too. 210
The policy considerations raised by local constitutional enforcement
may be sorted into four general subject categories: autonomy, democracy,
competency, and federalism.
A. The Autonomy Question
We begin by considering the argument that local constitutional enforce-
ment undermines local autonomy. Generally speaking, those who favor lo-
cal autonomy prefer a system in which local democratic majorities-which
are of course state and federal minorities-enjoy legal and political indepen-
dence from the policy preferences of state and federal majorities. Needless
206See discussion infra Part VI.C.
207 Local constitutional cases fulfill what Akhil Reed Amar has called the "remedial im-
perative." Amar, supra note 20, at 1484-92.
2 Scholarly debates over local power tend to cluster around these themes. See discus-
sion, supra Part I.
209 Cristina M. Rodriguez takes a similar position in discussing local governments and
immigration policy in The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 567, 591 (2008). See also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitu-
tionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 375-76 (2007) (arguing that our
democracy is strengthened by a healthy struggle over the meanings of constitutional norms).
210 New State Ice Co. v. Lineman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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to say, the concern that a particular law or policy may undermine local au-
tonomy is serious and carries a great deal of weight.
As applied to local constitutional enforcement, the autonomy argument
is entirely correct. It cannot be denied that, when successful, local constitu-
tional enforcement results in court opinions that subject every locality in the
relevant jurisdiction to state and/or federal constitutional norms. We must
therefore ask whether and when other values relevant to local governmental
and democratic efficacy outweigh the value of autonomy.
One might begin this weighing process by considering the distinction
between autonomy and power. Scholars often use the terms autonomy and
power interchangeably. If a doctrine weakens local autonomy, the thinking
goes, those who favor local power should be against it.211 But those terms
are not always interchangeable. By "autonomy" I mean independence or
freedom: the ability to act without being impeded by another.2 12 By
"power" I mean strength or might or force: the ability to do or accomplish
something.213 Applying these definitions to localities, "autonomy" refers to
a locality's ability to pass independent (sometimes overlapping, sometimes
interstitial) laws across a range of subject matter areas also addressed by
state and federal law (e.g., health care, financial regulation, environmental
pollution, etc.). "Power" translates into a locality's ability to improve the
lives of its constituents, whether it does so by creating local laws or leverag-
ing state or federal laws.
If "autonomy" and "power" were synonymous, one could reasonably
assume that what a legal rule does to the former, it does to the latter. But
since they are not synonymous, we should not assume they rise and fall
together. Indeed, somewhat counter-intuitively, a legal rule that undermines
autonomy might simultaneously enhance power, and vice versa.
As David Barron and Richard Schragger have argued, local constitu-
tional enforcement does seek to enforce federal or state law, possibly at the
expense of local decision-making.2 14 But such cases also enhance local
power. When a locality brings a constitutional claim, it does more than turn
up the volume on the underlying constitutional debate. It also forces its state
government to publicly engage that debate. 2 15 By contrast, if the same local-
211 The existing scholarship generally assumes that more local autonomy would be prefer-
able in some respects; the debate tends to be over whether local autonomy would come at too
high a price. Richard Briffault and Richard Ford have pointed out that local autonomy has
painful side effects. See Briffault, supra note 12, at 5-6; Briffault, supra note 36, at 355
("Local autonomy enables . . . suburbs to protect their resources from the fiscal needs of
nearby cities while securing their independence from involvement in the resolution of urban or
metropolitan economic or social problems."); see also Ford, supra note 166, at 1183 (calling
autonomy, "at least in the strong sense .. . an impossible and dangerous dream").
212 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STm. L. REV. 875, 880-83
(1994) (describing the "negative libertarian," or non-interference, conception of autonomy).
213 See id.
214 See discussion supra Part I.
215 See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (by filing suit, city forced state to
respond in open court to constitutional challenge to ballot measure); In re Marriage Cases, 183
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ity were to enact local legislation allowing marriage between same-sex
couples, the locality will have spoken but the state government is free to
ignore it. Moreover, if a locality wins a constitutional case, its constituents
are protected throughout the relevant constitutional jurisdiction, whether fed-
eral or state. If it passes a local ordinance, protection for its constituents
ends at the local border.2 16
One can imagine other examples in which a locality might willingly
trade autonomy for power. A city that is displeased by the state or federal
response to problems surrounding immigration or health care might choose
autonomy by passing local ordinances addressing those subjects. But it
might rather enter into an agreement with the state and/or federal govern-
ments, or enforce state or federal law against those governments, to solve its
local immigration or public health problems. The latter options might solve
the problem more effectively and efficiently than enacting (and forever ad-
ministering) a local ordinance.217
Barron has argued for substantive limits on local constitutional enforce-
ment in part because localities should not be able to force extra-local (fed-
eral and state constitutional) norms on other cities.218 But a local
governmental litigant has only so much power. It can open the conversation
by filing a complaint; it can make arguments; it cannot force outcomes. The
courts ultimately decide what our federal and state constitutions mean. If a
different locality holds a contrary view on the merits, it can intervene as a
party or amicus curiae.
While local autonomy is a laudable goal, local constituents may ulti-
mately reap more benefits if localities move towards increasing and leverag-
ing access to state and federal power than if they push for greater local
autonomy.2 19 Moreover, as a purely political matter, pushing for an increase
in localities' ability to tap into state or federal power may be less threatening
to state and federal actors than pushing for more local autonomy, because
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (by filing suit, city forced state to respond in open court to constitutional
challenges to marriage statutes).
216 Schragger, supra note 202, at 2557. Richard Schragger similarly argues that increased
autonomy does not always lead to increased power. Id.
217 To provide a concrete example, a city that wishes to discourage undocumented immi-
grants from settling within its borders might act autonomously by passing an ordinance that
forbids residents from housing or employing undocumented immigrants. Alternately, it might
leverage federal power by entering into an agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement through which its police officers operate as agents of the federal government.
See Rodriguez, supra note 209, at 591 (discussing "section 287g of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, which authorizes states and localities to enter into agreements with the federal
government, which in turn authorize local and state officials to arrest and detain individuals for
immigration violations and to investigate immigration cases").
218 Barron, supra note 2, at 2221.
29 As Richard Briffault has correctly observed, federal and state power are "not necessa-
rily the enemy of local power." Briffault, supra note 36, at 356.
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state and federal officials have potentially more influence over the exercise
of that power.220
The economic and technological revolutions of recent decades are caus-
ing localities to become more sophisticated, more nationally and globally
intertwined, and generally more active in law and policy arenas formerly
reserved to state, national and international actors.221 Given these trends,
advocating for localism-as-increased-autonomy may be not only more diffi-
cult, but less useful, than advocating for localism-as-increased-power.
B. The Democracy Question
We might also consider how allowing local constitutional enforcement
would impact our democracy. Would such cases undermine democratic val-
ues by taking discretion away from states and localities, or strengthen them
by encouraging citizens at the local level to engage in state and federal con-
stitutional debates? This Article offers three distinct points on local consti-
tutional enforcement and democracy.
The first point is that welcoming localities into constitutional cases as
plaintiffs would democratize constitutional litigation. At present, our na-
tional docket of constitutional cases consists largely of conversations be-
tween private, specialized legal organizations and the federal judiciary.222
Non-profit legal organizations are comprised of unelected experts that focus
on a single issue or cluster of issues. They cannot be elected or removed,
hired or fired. Specialized legal organizations offer unique substantive ex-
pertise, but they are immune from oversight by those whose interests they
serve. In other words, while they are important players in our nation' s con-
stitutional debates, it seems profoundly undemocratic for the laws to allow
specialized private legal organizations, but not local public entities, full par-
ticipatory access to constitutional litigation. 223
The second, broader point about local constitutional enforcement and
democracy is this: Allowing localities to pursue constitutional claims would
bring constitutional litigation closer to the People.224 At present, localities
220 See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended in scattered portions of 8 U.S.C.); see also Theda Skocpol, The Toc-
queville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy, 21 Soc. Sci. Hisi. 455, 461,
468 (1997) (explaining in the context of local volunteer associations that, historically, they
flourished because they plugged into extra-local governments).
221 Judith Resnik, New Federalism(s): Translocal Organization of Government Actors
(TOGAs) Reshaping Boundaries, Policies, and Laws, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS 83 (2010)
(exploring the increasingly sophisticated range of local governmental activities and alliances).
222 See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MAN-
AGEMENT IN AMERICAN CiviL LIFE 288-93 (2003); see also Theda Skocpol, Advocates Without
Members, in Civic ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 498-504 (Theda Skocpol & Mor-
ris P. Fiorina eds., 1999).
223 The non-democratic result is arguably made worse when plaintiffs are represented
solely by non-profits from outside the community.
224 See Gerken, supra note 45, at 1763.
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can be defendants but not plaintiffs in constitutional cases. There is some-
thing deeply disturbing about a legal system that casts local governments
only as violators-never champions-of the Constitution. Moreover, per-
mitting-even encouraging-localities to engage in constitutional and other
public interest litigation would give local constituents (that is, all of us) the
sense that our local public law offices are, at least in part, public interest law
firms; that they represent not just local public entities, but the citizens behind
them, likely strengthening the bond between local governments and their
constituents.225
This argument finds indirect support in Robert Post and Reva Siegel's
notion of "democratic constitutionalism." Post and Siegel argue in favor of
social movements rather than local governments as sites for popular engage-
ment with constitutional norms.226 But their central insight-that the Consti-
tution's authority depends on its democratic legitimacy, which in turn
depends on whether Americans see it as their Constitution-supports local
constitutional enforcement. Indeed, one might even view local constitu-
tional enforcement as one of the purest forms of democratic constitutional-
ism. While Post and Siegel cast governments in the familiar role of the
alleged constitutional violators,227 in the context of local enforcement, locali-
ties are the Constitution's champions. So, while Post and Siegel envision
democratic constitutionalism as a process that necessarily toggles back and
forth between "electoral politics" and "constitutional lawmaking,"228 local
constitutional enforcement fuses politics and lawmaking by casting elected
leaders as active agents in constitutional lawmaking.
The opposite of democratic constitutionalism is what we have now,
namely, constitutional disengagement. In City Making, Gerald Frug sur-
veyed the extensive scholarship decrying the American disconnect between
citizens and government, with a special emphasis on local government. 229
Local constitutional enforcement may help close the gap between the People
and their governments. When local citizens find allies in locally elected
officials, and listen as those officials represent their local view on constitu-
tional values in a court of law, it may well bind those citizens in new ways to
the Constitution and the body politic.
225 This argument is more than theoretical. In the midst of San Francisco's court disputes
over the marriage laws, lawyers from the San Francisco City Attorney's Office marched in the
annual gay pride parade. As they approached, the crowds lining the parade route could be
heard shouting, "Here come our lawyers!" The marriage case and other constitutional cases
have forged a deep connection between the City Attorney and his constituents; in 2009 he ran
unopposed and was almost unanimously re-elected to a third term in office.
226 See Post & Siegel, supra note 209, at 375-76.227 Id. at 374.
228 Id
229 See FRUG, supra note 21, at 19-25; see also Williams, supra note 10. Similarly, Rich-
ard Schragger has expressed concern that our national political culture is "increasingly alien-
ated from governance generally, and from local governance in particular." Schragger, supra
note 5, at 396.
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Some may claim that the law should discourage local constitutional en-
forcement because it risks factionalizing our democracy and increasing inter-
governmental discord."' That concern is certainly valid, but does not seem
terribly weighty when placed in a broader context. The fact is that federal,
state, and local governments are in near constant tension over any number of
heated issues. Given the interconnectedness of our multiple layers of gov-
ernment, such conflicts will surely continue. It seems unlikely that local
constitutional challenges will have much net effect on intergovernmental
tensions overall. Moreover, among the forms that local rebellion might take,
filing a lawsuit seems relatively tame, since a court of law is such a carefully
controlled public forum for resolving constitutional disputes.
One could argue that such public disagreements might ultimately
strengthen rather than weaken our democracy. While lawsuits certainly raise
tension, they also serve as a "dynamic form of contestation, the democratic
chum necessary for an ossified national system to move forward." 231
Viewed in context, the risk to smooth democratic functioning that may at-
tend local constitutional enforcement probably does not justify a complete
ban on such cases.
The third point about local constitutional enforcement and democracy is
this: As courts and scholars consider whether localities should be permitted
access to the Constitution, they might consider the wide array of groups and
entities that enjoy constitutional protection. For example, the Court recently
reaffirmed its commitment to granting private corporations-and by exten-
sion their private shareholders-the full panoply of constitutional rights.232
And as we have seen, the nation's 39,000 localities are not just units of
representative democracy but also public corporations with commercial and
governmental interests. Because those interests are financially backed by
local taxation, local constituents are in some sense shareholders in local pub-
lic entities. It is worth considering whether democracy and the public inter-
est are served by granting private corporations backed by shareholders, but
not public corporations backed by taxed constituents, access to at least some
constitutional provisions.
C. The Competency Question
The next policy question is whether local public entities are sufficiently
competent to engage fully in constitutional litigation. It may well be that, as
things currently stand, local public law offices are not staffed up to pursue
affirmative constitutional cases. Moreover, as compared to the national and
state governments, and perhaps even to private entities that engage regularly
230 See Post & Siegel, supra note 209, at 375-76 (responding to similar arguments in the
backlash context).
231 Gerken, supra note 34, at 10; see also Post & Siegel, supra note 209, at 381-83 (dis-
cussing the democratic and constitutional merits of robust "norm contestation").
232 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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in constitutional litigation, some localities may be relatively untested in this
area.233
Having said that, facts on the ground show that localities are accus-
tomed to evaluating and enforcing constitutional norms. As Alec Ewald has
written, civil servants are the individuals who primarily "run the Constitu-
tion." 234 "[Tlhey reduce its grand principles to practice by their actions
both routine and extraordinary." 235 To provide just a few examples, mayor's
offices routinely announce time, place, and manner restrictions to rally re-
quests. Sheriff's offices develop strip search policies to be applied to pretrial
detainees. Public hospitals determine whether patients are entitled to abor-
tions. Police chiefs develop policies on the permissible use of force during
an arrest. Public contracting agencies evaluate the constitutionality of pro-
grams designed to remedy race discrimination. Legislative aids draft ordi-
nances in the shadow of the Supremacy Clause. And for their part, local
public law offices routinely help their clients make a wide range of constitu-
tional determinations.
Indeed, local judgments about the Constitution's meaning are routinely
challenged in federal court, where localities (not states) are held financially
responsible for their own errors in judgment.236 On the whole, localities are
probably the most active members of what Ewald called the "'interpretive
community' that gives the Constitution its meaning. "237 Accordingly, if one
may accurately claim that localities are constitutionally incompetent, we
might consider that a serious problem, and prioritize increasing local consti-
tutional competency.
One might respond to the concern about local constitutional incompe-
tence with a counterargument: In light of their regular (albeit non-litigation)
experience interpreting multiple constitutional provisions in multiple con-
texts, localities would bring a unique and rich body of knowledge to consti-
tutional cases. In other words, there are good reasons to see localities as
uniquely competent, rather than uniquely incompetent, to interpret the Con-
233 For example, John Dillon wrote that persons who ran local governments were unfit "by
their intelligence, business experience, capacity, and moral character" to be trusted with real
power. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 85-86 (2d ed., rev. New
York, James Cockcroft & Co. 1873); see also FRUG, supra note 21, at 6, 19 (explaining that the
conventional view is that local governments are inherently selfish, shortsighted, parochial, and
ineffectual); Schragger, supra note 5, at 403. Schragger has argued that the uncertain charac-
ter of the law regarding the place of local government in our lives reflects a deep and abiding
national ambivalence, "a romantic vision of participatory democracy in small-scale settings
accompanied by a mistrust of local officials and a suspicion that local power is often abused."
Schragger, supra note 5, at 394. For more on John Dillon, see discussion, supra Part I.A.
2 34 ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DBtENSION OF AmERIcAN Sue-
FRAGE 3 (2009).
235 Id. at 160 n.10 (quoting JOHN ROHR, CIVIL SERVANTS AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONs 141
(2002)).
236 See Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883) (ruling
that a tort judgment against a locality cannot be collected from the state).
237 EwALD, supra note 234, at 13.
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stitution. Their participation in constitutional litigation would enhance,
rather than diminish, the quality of such litigation and, by extension, judicial
decision-making.
D. The Federalism Question
Finally, we might consider how the Hunter doctrine, and Hunter itself,
fits into the broader federalism discussion. We have 39,000 local public
entities in this country, but we lack a theory that fully explains their place in
our constitutional architecture.238 This is a major topic that is well beyond
the scope of this Article, but it is worth offering a few observations about the
Hunter doctrine's relation to federalism.
First, the Constitution says nothing about localities. When it comes to
vertical governance structures, the Founders drafted that document to negoti-
ate the relationship between the federal government and the states. The
Founders' silence with respect to localities could be interpreted in any num-
ber of ways. One could argue that the Founders' silence means they did not
intend for the Constitution to govern how states treat their own localities.
By that logic, localities qua localities should not be permitted to bring con-
stitutional claims against their own states. One could push that argument
even further, by arguing that the Founders did not intend for any body of
federal law or branch of the federal government to step between localities
and their states. By that broader logic, the federal courts should not consider
any legal disputes, whether brought under federal or state law, between lo-
calities and their states; Congress should not grant localities standing to sue
their states under any federal statutes;39 and agencies in the executive
branch should not enter into contractual relationships or form other legal
alliances with localities without the express approval of their states. 240
Or, one could interpret the Founders' silence regarding localities quite
differently. Bearing in mind constitutional limits on the exercise of federal
power vis-a-vis state governments, one could argue that the Founders did not
intend to say one way or the other whether localities could enforce constitu-
tional norms. One could argue, further, that the Founders would not have
wanted the Court to wade into questions surrounding the "nature" of locali-
ties and their relationship to the states. In other words, rather than reading
into the Founders' silence a positive federal rule of local powerlessness vis-
A-vis state governments, we could read into it an intention to allow state
238 See Gerken, supra note 34, at 13.
239 Certain federal statutes contemplate that localities might enforce federal law against
their own states. See, e.g., Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 60101(a)(17), 60121
(2006) (including localities as "persons" entitled to sue to enforce the Act's provisions, some
of which mandate certain state action).
240 For example, section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes locali-
ties to enter into agreements with the federal government without requiring state governmental
approval. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). See
Rodriguez, supra note 209, at 591 (discussing local agreements under INA section 287(g)).
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constitutions and statutes to determine the nature of localities and their rela-
tionship to the states.
This leads to a broad conceptual point about structural constitutional
law. Our nation has fifty-one constitutions, and each one of them has struc-
tural provisions intended to "design" their corner of our democracy.2 41 One
view of the federal and state constitutions-and by extension, federal and
state governments-is that they occupy different space, like separate floors
in a building. But another view is that the fifty-one constitutions-along
with the governance structures they contemplate-are distinct yet interre-
lated, like the various systems of the human body. We might think of the
federal government as the nation's major organ systems, largest bones, and
central nervous system; the state governments as its major muscle groups,
minor organ systems, and medium-sized bones; and local governments as its
connective tissue, nerve endings, and tiniest bones. Viewing the structural
provisions of all fifty-one constitutions as interconnected parts of a federalist
whole may help bring local governments into sharper relief.
VI. IMAGINING AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Setting aside Hunter's general doctrine of local powerlessness would
clear a path for scholars to develop an alternative theoretical framework for
local government law.2 42 At present, the Court's view of localities can be
fairly summed up as such: They are components of state governments ex-
cept when they are not (but we do not know when or why), and they can
bring constitutional claims except when they cannot (but we do not know
when or why). Local government scholarship has been stuck in this doctri-
nal mess for decades, and has attempted in vain to make sense of it. It may
not be possible to develop an overarching theory of local government law. 243
Perhaps not, but there is little point in even trying until Hunter is discarded.
My call for a deeper, more nuanced theoretical framework for local
government law is connected to Heather Gerken's recent call for the scholar-
ship to relax sovereignty's grip on constitutional theory and push federalism
"all the way down" to the local level. Having done so, she argues, scholars
can focus attention on "the institutions neglected by federalists and their
localist counterparts," namely, all non-city localities.2" She explains that
because scholarship has not looked beyond states, except at cities, "we lack
241 See generally CASS R. SuNsTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONs Do
(2001).
242 Gerken, supra note 34, at 13.
243 See Briffault, supra note 36, at 356 ("The different kinds of local governments, with
their diverse needs and often conflicting concerns, cast real doubt on the utility of 'local gov-
ernment' as a category for advancing legal analysis.").
2 See Gerken, supra note 34, at 12-13 (referring specifically to non-city localities, which
have been largely ignored even in the local government scholarship); see also Briffault, supra
note 2, at 347-48.
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a set of common terms-let alone a full-blown theory-for the sites that fall
just below states and cities on the governance flow chart." 245 Discarding
Hunter would help clear the way for legal scholarship to develop theories
that root localities in our constitutional system.
Doing so may help localities fulfill their promise as governmental
agents and units of representative democracy. This is not a liberal or a con-
servative point, but rather, a point about democracy and good government.
David Barron has said, correctly, that "legal limits [rather than practical or
political limits] are . . . often the critical barriers to [cities'] capacit[ies] to
implement their own visions of the future."2 46 Setting aside Hunter's general
presumption of local powerlessness would allow scholars to fold localities
into theories of federalism and reconsider the relationship between localities
and the Constitution. These are the next major challenges for scholarship at
the intersection of local government and constitutional law.
245 Gerken, supra note 34, at 2.
24 6 Barron, supra note 201, at 812.
2012] 45
